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PRODUCTS LIABILITY - EMERGING CONSENSUS
AND PERSISTING PROBLEMS: AN ANALYTICAL
REVIEW PRESENTING SOME OPTIONS
DR. J. STANLEY MCQUADE*
PART I - INTRODUCTION AND DESCRIPTION OF METHODS
§1 The problem and various responses to it
The National Commission on Product Safety reported in 1970
that 20 million Americans are injured each year in accidents related to
defective products.' Of these over 100,000 were permanently injured
resulting in 30,000 deaths.2 Similar figures in proportion to popula-
tion were reported for Britain and for continental Europe.3 A number
* Dr. J. Stanley McQuade, Lynch Professor of the Philosophy of Law, received his
law degree with top honors from The Queens University of Belfast in 1950. Thereafter
he received his B.D., B.A., Ph.D., and M.D. degrees from the same university, as well as
a Masters degree in Theology from Union Theological Seminary. A certified
anesthesiologist, he is a prominent national lecturer on law and medicine topics. He
has also served for 25 years as a Methodist minister and has published several works
in the areas of law and medicine and jurisprudence, including Jurisfiction, Analyzing
Medical Records, Medical Practice for Trial Lawyers, and Determining Medical Damages
and Disability. He is also Medical Editor for Westnet's ten-volume Attorney's Medical
Advisor and Atlas. Dr. McQuade teaches jurisprudence, Products Liability, and Law
and Medicine at Campbell University School of Law.
1. National Commission on Product Safety, Final Report 1970, p.1 .
2. Id.
3. These and other valuable statistics and comments on the same can be found in
studies by Christian Jeorges et al., on the Europeanization of public safety law,
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of strategies have been developed to deal with this situation, including
the following:
1. Funding and encouraging research to determine the causes of
product related accidents, with a view to developing preventive
strategies.
2. Developing government regulations and standards backed by pen-
alties, for manufacturers and suppliers.
3. Publishing private standards by industry organizations.
4. Public education projects to encourage safe practices by users.
5. Private litigation to compensate injured persons, but also to
encourage concern for safety among manufacturers.
These various approaches to the problem interact with and sup-
port one another to some extent. Governmental regulations provide
standards and create legal duties which courts can use in private litiga-
tion. Litigation provides a tax-free (though by no means cost free)
enforcement agency for the regulatory agencies. Public education in
safety provides respect for product law and may also function in the
courts as the context for instructions and warnings.
Much ink has been spilled discussing the effectiveness of each one
of these measures. They are all beset with problems, many of which
appear to be endemic. The reporting of accidents, which provides one
of the most important data bases for research, has proved to have
numerous difficulties, both theoretical and practical. Measuring
hazards is a science in itself, with more than one way to do it and with
the choice of method affecting the results.4 Government regulations
may be inappropriate and out of touch with what is really happening
in industry and even when apt, the regulations are often unenforced.5
Private standards, provided by industry, must achieve some kind of
consensus agreement among the collaborating manufacturers. These
standards thus tend to be to represent the lowest common denomina-
tor that will be acceptable to the business community. Public educa-
tion has a place, but it is becoming apparent that very large
expenditures of money and effort are required to produce very modest
changes in public behavior. Private litigation does not seem to have
dramatically reduced the incidence of product related accidents. Man-
published in German as Christian Jeorges, Josef Falke, Hans-W. Micklitz, Die
Sicherheit von Kosnumguitern und die Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden:
Nomos 1988. Translated into English and made available on the Internet in English at
http://www.iue.it/LAW/WP-Texts/Joerges9l/editor.htm.
4. See Jeorges et al., supra note 3, at § 1.2.
5. Cynics, and they may be right, claim that legislators produce numerous safety
regulations, which please the general public, and then do not enforce them, which
pleases industry, so that everybody is happy though nothing gets done.
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ufacturers, who have been sued, tend to make changes in their designs
and in the warnings and instructions that accompany their products-
but the accidents still occur, for it is impossible to produce a com-
pletely accident-proof car (or any other device). Someone, somewhere
will somehow manage to have an accident and be injured.
Nevertheless, these efforts have not been entirely in vain. The
chairman of the National Product Consumer Safety Commission,
established in 1973, reported to Congress in 1981 that the number of
accidents had risen to 33 million per year with 28,000 deaths and an
annual cost to the nation of 500 billion dollars.6 In 2001, the report
showed some improvement with 29 million product related injuries
resulting in 22,000 deaths, and the cost of accidents to the nation was
reported to have decreased by some two to three billion annually.7 The
report attributed the improvement to the efforts of the Commission
and other concerned groups and parties. The most significant
decreases were in the area of children's toys and bedding materials,
where safer design is possible. This lowering of accident rates is com-
mendable but small and the reduction in cost to the nation, again
desirable, represents only a little bite out of a 500 billion-dollar apple.8
The focus of this article is on the legal response, but not with
much hope that this or any other means will make a significant impact
on the incidence of product related accidents. If user fault is a major
component in most of these accidents, as seems to be the case, they
will continue to occur at a high level of frequency, since it is very diffi-
cult to produce fool-proof articles or cause changes in user behavior.
The aim is rather to produce a clear representation of the present law,
and to consider how it might be improved to achieve certain modest
ends especially:
1. To facilitate the just compensation of accident victims.
2. To make the compensation system fair not only to those injured,
but also to the community at large (community respect for the law
is important).
3. To allow reputable manufacturers to function without being dis-
tracted from their business by excessive concern about the possi-
bility of litigation.
4. To help business interests competing in foreign markets.
6. Jeorges et al., supra note 3, at §1.1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
2002]
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These objectives, like all values, will conflict at times and must be
balanced against one another to achieve the best result. This can be
described as a harmony of values (justice as defined by Plato). 9
§2 Brief historical introduction to products liability law
The relevant history of products liability actions is very recent. It
began early in the twentieth century with the landmark case of Mac-
Pherson v Buick Motor Co. 10 However, it was not until the nineteen-
sixties that the pace of development accelerated and radical changes
began to occur. Expansion continued through the seventies and early
eighties with recoveries by injured plaintiffs becoming easier and
larger in amount. The cost, both financially and in other ways, became
apparent. In the more difficult economic times of the eighties, some
counter-movements began, designed to check or even reverse many of
the earlier plaintiff-friendly developments. The products liability
reform statutes, which these counter-reformations produced, have
been controversial, and the struggle between the plaintiffs' and
defenses' interests continues with reform legislation being challenged
in the courts and in some cases being declared unconstitutional. 1
All this legal activity has provided a wealth of material for schol-
arly analysis and very able people have been at work, organizing and
arranging these materials into a mature legal apparatus that is consis-
tent and complex enough to handle most products liability situa-
tions. 2 However, this work is still relatively recent and not as well
9. Republic, Book 5, where justice in the individual soul and also in the state are
described as a harmony among the constituent elements of each.
10. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
11. This history has been recounted in innumerable articles and in court opinions.
See R.A. Epstein, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS p.7 14 (7th ed. 2000). See also James
Henderson & Aaron Twerski, PRODUCTS LIABILITY p. 2 0 4 (3rd ed. 1997).
12. The European Union model products directive is very simple, not to say
simplistic, and presents only general principles which member nations (and also
cooperating nations in other parts of the world, e.g., the middle and far east) are
expected to embody in more detailed legislation. Not all members have complied and
there is still a good deal of generality in the formulations used. This is of course to be
expected in Civil Law jurisdictions where the code is expressed in rather general terms
that are expected to be filled out by case law (officially not binding). European
lawyers have, not surprisingly, looked to American developments to fill in the gaps.
Furthermore, the EEC directive, which was produced in the sixties, adopted somewhat
uncritically §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and so inherited all the
problems lurking within that apparently clear and fair statement. The most important
example is the failure to distinguish the different types of defect, with all kinds lumped
together and defined in terms of the "user expectation test" which has now been
largely abandoned by the majority of the courts and most learned commentators in
[Vol. 25:1
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/1
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - EMERGING CONSENSUS
known as it should be to practicing lawyers and judges. Otherwise
competent and capable judges have admitted that they are uncomforta-
ble hearing products cases. Some have even confessed (privately) that
their main objective, when they must hear one, is to maneuver proce-
durally to avoid being overruled and embarrassed. There is a great
deal of excellent literature on the subject, but it is often complex and
difficult to master without help. What is proposed here is a simple
analytical presentation designed to help members of the legal commu-
nity who are not familiar with the area to get a clear overall picture and
enable them to make up their own minds on issues where there is no
general agreement. The proposed treatment may be outlined as
follows:
The remainder of the introductory section (Part I) will outline
methods and presuppositions. Part II will present a very brief over-
view of the modern history of the development of products liability
law, showing how a consensus on the major issues has emerged. Part
III will deal with some central notions in modern products liability
law. Part IV will describe and discuss some persistent remaining
problems and suggest possible solutions.
In making proposals to resolve these perennial problems, I am not
presuming to tell the legal community what to do, but rather am laying
out the various options, with the arguments for and against them, so
that legal professionals can select the course that seems best to them
and do so in a rational manner. Unfortunately, much of the discus-
sion of these troublesome issues in learned periodicals, takes place in
a political framework and indeed commonly takes the form of thinly
disguised political rhetoric, so that one can predict the ultimate solu-
tion that the protagonists will propose by understanding their political
affiliations. In so far as it can be avoided, I have tried to stay clear of
this kind of political discussion and sought rather to focus on the kind
of decision-making that lawyers of any political persuasion (or none)
might engage in.
the U.S. It must be remarked, however, that the European Community and its affiliates
consider themselves to have a number of significant advantages over the U.S;
especially that they have no juries; no punitive damages; few or no collateral sources;
limited recoveries for pain and suffering, etc. See PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION:
MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT, National Academy Press (1994). See
also Stephen B. Presser, How should the Law of Products Liability be Harmonized? What
Americans Can Learn From Europeans, GLOBAL LIABILITY ISSUES Vol. 2 (February, 2002).
20021
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§3 Underlying presuppositions and methods - the use of modern logics
and value theory
I acknowledge without apology, as a teacher of Jurisprudence, a
firm belief in the practical importance for law of reflection on basic
underlying notions-in other words philosophy. Philosophical ques-
tions, like the notion of defect in products liability, are difficult to
define in general, but can be arranged (like Roman Gaul and modern
products law) into three sets of questions. These are:
1. Ontology: questions about the nature of anything. One may ask
for instance what is an electron? or what is space? or what is mind?
or what is law? Various answers are possible to each of these ques-
tions, and in the eyes of some they are unanswerable and therefore
frivolous and unimportant. We will not debate at present the charge of
frivolity, but will take issue with any who doubt their importance. The
various views on the nature of law have produced the schools of juris-
prudence and have profoundly affected the ways in which law is
researched, studied and practiced. However, ontological questions do
not directly impinge on products liability law to any great extent and
will be set-aside for the present.
2. Logic. This is theory about method, the ways in which knowl-
edge or argument should be formally arranged, and is commonly
called formalism. Organization is vital in any serious study and is cer-
tainly so with law. Critics of legal logic and especially logical skeptics,
seem to have completely failed to understand what modern logic is
about. It has virtually nothing to do with the syllogisms of Aristotle,
which in my (possibly radical) opinion no longer have any place in
legal education and not much use elsewhere. Aristotle's logic stimu-
lated medieval lawyers to introduce form and organization into the
writing and teaching of law. They saw themselves as Aristotelians, but
fortunately did not attempt to squeeze law into the syllogism. Instead,
they devised looser and less clearly defined arrangements, using ele-
ments (key terms) to organize cases under the forms of action, and
developed maxims to direct the law to good ends. Including cases
under legal categories, like negligence or nuisance, may seem like syl-
logistic logic, but there is one essential difference-the conclusion is
not contained in the major premise and does not follow necessarily
from it, as the syllogism requires. Modern formal systems (logics) only
resemble the syllogism in the most general ways and can be grouped in
three classes, namely:
a. word logics: identifying key terms and applying them to cases;
b. branching logics: algorithms that take one through the serial steps
of an organizational or decisional process;
[Vol. 25:1
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c. factor analysis: where considerations are balanced against one
another in deciding whether or not to take some course of action.
Word logics are so commonly used in legal analysis that no fur-
ther explanation is required. Defining and applying key terms has
been the major tool of legal education and legal writing from the era of
the great Roman jurisconsultants through modern times.
Algorithms are basically the tools used by computers to perform
functions. They are also extensively used in medical and business
practice, where they act as communication devices (showing how the
author views a subject matter) or as check lists to make sure that no
important consideration (e.g. a symptom or a diagnosis) has been
overlooked. Branching diagrams have been used in this article to
represent particular areas of products liability law.
Factor analysis is extensively used in making difficult decisions.
In medicine it may be used to decide whether to treat a condition med-
ically or resort to a surgical procedure. It is also used in business, for
instance to decide at what point to sell shares. Factor analysis is also
used, or perhaps abused, in legal writing, e.g., in deciding when to
make a smelly factory move elsewhere. The sad thing about the legal
factors is that they are simply listed, with no means of determining
how the list is to be used. In medicine and business there are two
basic methods of handling factors. They can be divided into major and
minor items and a formula provided to help make the decision
(weighted factor systems). This method is used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), to help decide which
is the most appropriate diagnostic category for a particular set of
symptoms. For example, the diagnosis of Alzheimer's dementia
requires the presence of memory impairment as the one essential
major factor. The diagnosis is then confirmed by the presence of a
certain number of items from a list of minor factors. The factors can
also be quantified depending on whether they are clearly present,
doubtfully present, or absent. The numbers assigned to each factor
can then be summed to provide a total score that can be used to assist
decision-making. A number of these organizational tools (word logics,
branching computer logics and factored decisional logics) will be used
in this article. 13
3. Value theory. This is a consideration of the ends and goals of
human behavior. It inevitably crops up in any difficult legal decision,
especially in "hard cases" where Peter can only be paid at the expense
13. The underlying formal theories indicated here have been discussed more fully
in J. Stanley McQuade, Medieval Ratio and Modern Formal Studies: A Reconsideration of
Coke's Dictum That Law is the Perfection of Reason, 38 AM. J. JURIs. 359 (1993).
20021
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of Paul, and where any proposal has something to be said against it.
These controversial matters commonly boil down to different percep-
tion of values. The conflict of opinion can only be resolved if some
agreement is reached as to the nature and importance of the relevant
values-a philosophical matter. If the notion of value is simply a
dressed up version of "I prefer"(the emotive theory of value), then these
arguments, and indeed most serious discussions, will go on forever
unless or until the parties are somehow persuaded that it is in their
common interest to take one side or the other. The other general
option, that there are real values, is taken here to be the preferred view.
I have argued this position elsewhere, 4 but there is no need to do so
here, since the main values involved in products liability discussion are
neither abstract nor controversial (though their application may be
problematical). These values may be conveniently divided into several
groups as follows:
1. Values related to persons.
a. Persons injured by defective products should be compensated.
b. Producers should be encouraged to take measures to reduce
the risk of harm to users.
c. Users of products should be encouraged to adopt safe prac-
tices and so avoid injuries.
2. Societal values.
a. The dollar costs of injuries (medical services, Workers' Com-
pensation, etc.) should be kept as low as possible.
b. Loss to society of the services of injured persons should be
reduced to a minimum.
c. Ethical business operators and managers should be able to do
their job without constant worry of possible litigation, i.e.
focus on functioning rather than risk management.
d. Producers should not be deterred from developing or market-
ing worthwhile products simply because they carry a high risk
of litigation.
e. Businesses should not be disadvantaged in exporting to for-
eign markets, e.g. the European Economic Community, where
production costs are lower because the law there is more kind
to manufacturers.
3. Legal values.
a. The law should be clear and understandable, internally con-
sistent, and capable of predictable application to cases.
14. "Marketing Natural Law" a completed paper currently being reviewed by
learned colleagues with a view to publication.
[Vol. 25:1
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b. The business community should be able to ascertain, in
advance, their legal duties as to avoid litigation.
c. Litigation is to be avoided where possible.
d. If litigation proves necessary it should be handled efficiently,
i.e., reducing expense, confusion, time wasting, and aggrava-
tion as much as possible.
e. Settlement is preferable to litigation, with summary judgment
the next best option, followed by directed verdict, with a jury
trial only when all else fails.
The items in this list will be used to evaluate existing law and
proposed changes, acting as the goals that the law is intended to strive
toward, and if possible achieve. The list is by no means to be taken as
final, but only provisional-an opening gambit rather than an ultimate
game plan. Different sets of objectives could be produced, adding or
subtracting items from the above list. But no resolution of the endemic
problems of products liability law can be achieved without clearly list-
ing the agreed objectives to be achieved.
PART II-HISTORY - MODIFICATION OF OLD REMEDIES TO MAKE THEM
FUNCTIONAL IN MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
§4 Reasons for the rather late development of products liability law
Liability for defective products, as was said earlier, is not new in
the law. Provisions dealing with this subject can be found in every
system of law going back through the Middle Ages to Anglo-Saxon cus-
tomary law and even to ancient Middle East laws such as are found in
the Code of Hammurabi. i5 What is relatively new, is the variety of
products and complicated ways of producing them that have made the
older remedies ineffective. Yet although mass production and distribu-
tion have been with us for more than a century, most of the changes in
this branch of the law have taken place over the last few decades and
the development continues. There is usually some delay between need
and remedy in the law, but this one seems rather long. A number of
explanations for this tardiness have been given, all of them rather spec-
ulative. It has been viewed (dubiously I think) as capitalist class action
with the views of the legal profession reflecting their class origins. It
has also been explained in terms of economics, with the law valuing
and protecting developing industry and trade, which were deemed vital
15. Translation by L.W. King can be found on the Internet in the Avalon Project of
Yale University Law School at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/
hamcode.htm. See also G.R. Driver and J.C. Miles, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS (1952).
2002]
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for the common welfare at the time. 6 If this is the case, and it seems
the most plausible of the proposed explanations, the prosperity of the
sixties would represent the coming of age of industry and commerce,
when they should be expected to pay for the harm that they produce.
The recent, restrictive modifications may then be viewed as reflecting
more difficult economic times, and the perception that too liberal and
too easy recoveries have undesirable economic and social
consequences. 17
§5 The emergence of products liability as a distinct sub-category of
the law
Law does not develop by quantum leaps as a rule. It grows more
like a tree with new branches sprouting from the old. Such has cer-
tainly been the case with modern products law. The older remedies,
the actions in negligence, warranty and strict liability for dangerous
entities, have all been worked over and adapted to meet present needs.
Traces of these origins can still be seen in products liability remedies,
but increasingly they are breaking loose from their roots, requiring
that we treat them independently as new creations. And this view
commands wide support. Indeed the mixture of older concepts with
the emendations that have been made to them, has proved to be very
confusing to courts and juries.
§6 Modification of the negligence action in products cases
The action on the case for negligence was an adequate remedy for
defective products in the days when items for sale were made in small
factories or by individuals and purchased directly by the ultimate
users. In addition, most articles were mechanically simple so that
defects were usually obvious after an accident or even before it. The
manufacturing and distribution processes and even the products them-
selves are now much more complex. Two major changes in the law of
negligence were therefore needed before it could function adequately
in products liability cases namely:
1. Relaxation of the requirement of privity. The (correct) notion
that a specific duty had to be owed to the plaintiff by the defendant
had developed in rather odd ways following the English case of
Winterbottom v. Wright, decided in 1842. I8 This may well have been a
16. See L.M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW Ch. III (2d ed. 1995).
17. See R.A. Epstein, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS p.716 (7th ed. 2000). The
comment of the cynical physiologist may be appropriate here, that all explanations are
lies, but that some are more helpful than others.
18. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
[Vol. 25:1
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Illustration 1: The Modification of Older Legal Remedies to Meet
the Needs of Modern Products Liability Law.
case in contract 9 but was interpreted, especially in the United States,
as also applying in tort. Persons other than the original purchaser who
19. Assigning cases in the early nineteenth century to categories such as contract
and tort, is difficult and at times impossible since they were brought, argued and
decided under a particular writ such as trespass, trespass on the case, assumpsit, etc.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - EMERGING CONSENSUS
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had been injured by a defective product were therefore not allowed to
bring suit. A number of exceptions to the rule were gradually intro-
duced especially in relation to food, poisons, and other products gen-
erally categorized as dangerous.2 ° In the landmark case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., Judge Cardozo relaxed this requirement generally
and stated that the duty of reasonable care was owed by manufacturers
of potentially dangerous products to all persons who were likely to use
and be injured by them if they should prove defective.
2. Relaxation of the requirements of proof. Proof of negligent man-
ufacture21 is almost impossible in modern production systems. The
notion of "fault" has therefore been largely replaced by the more objec-
tive term "defect. ' 22 The two words are not totally different since a
defective product implies negligence somewhere in the manufacturing
system; but it was hoped that the objective concept, defect, would be
easier for the plaintiff to prove. However presence of defect can still be
difficult to show, especially when the product is hopelessly damaged
in an accident. Courts in many jurisdictions dealing with products
cases, have therefore felt impelled to relax the requirement that the
plaintiff shall prove zes2 3 case in every detail. Circumstantial evidence
may be allowed to go to the jury in cases where the accident itself
suggests a strong likelihood that a defect was present in the article
when it left the control of the manufacturer/supplier. 24 The expres-
sion, "res ipsa loquitur" is not heard much in recent products cases
and may not even be allowable in some jurisdictions, but circumstan-
tial evidence is commonly allowed to plaintiffs in cases where it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that there was something wrong
in the manufacture of a product. A typical example would be the "pop
bottle" case where a jury question may be raised by the fact of the
bottle exploding spontaneously, if it can be shown that a similar explo-
sion had occurred recently with another drink bottled by the same
defendant.25 It should be noted that this relaxation of the require-
20. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903), which
summarized the position in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth
century.
21. Not negligent design or insufficient warnings/instructions which tend to follow
the negligence model.
22. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
23. The "Z" gender-free convention has been used here. "Ze" replaces "he/she" and
"zes" stands for "his/hers."
24. This rule is formally recognized in Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products
Liability §3. Often referred to herein as (R3T-PL).
25. Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 228 N.C. 32, 44 S.E.2d 337 (1947); Florence
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 65 So. 2d 169 (Ala. 1953).
[Vol. 25:1
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ments of proof by the plaintiff does not normally apply in design or
warnings cases, being more appropriate to manufacturing defects.26
§7 Modification of the law of warranties in products cases - Express
Warranties
Express warranties had virtually ceased to exist after King Edward
I required that they be under seal.2 7 They were revived in modern
products law with the holding that in certain circumstances, promo-
tional materials such as commercial advertising and brochures, could
create liability somewhat like an express warranty. This can happen in
two ways.
They can be construed as specific undertakings relating to safety
held out to the general public. 28 So the slogan "completely safe, even a
child could use it" may create liability. Since the action is in warranty
and not in negligence, evidence of due care will be deemed irrelevant
and excluded. Sometimes contributory negligence has not been
allowed as a defense, but the general trend is to allow contributory
fault to be considered in virtually all products liability cases, either to
reduce or bar recovery.
Promotional materials can create liability by blunting the natural
caution of the user (lulling them into a sense of false security). This
happens, for instance, with vehicles designed for use in rough terrain,
when drivers may conclude, after seeing the manufacturers' brochures
or videotapes that it is safe to drive down steep hills at high speeds.29
26. See §10 infra.
27. Born 1239, he was virtually king during the latter part of the reign of his
doubtfully competent father Henry III. He was crowned in 1272 and died in 1307.
King Edward was known as the English Justinian and some of his legislation (e.g. ch. 1
of Statute of Westminster II - the famous de donis conditionalibus) is still law in
England, America and other common law jurisdictions. He introduced the
requirement for a seal in order to prevent doubtful claims based on express warranties
that were then being brought rather frequently. Unfortunately the seal became
uncommon and so the action died out. See T.F.T. Plucknett, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW p. 366 (5th ed. 1956).
28. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932), is the classic case where
the manufacturer warranted that the car windshield would not shatter. Evidence of
the superior quality of the glass compared to that of other suppliers was refused as
irrelevant.
29. See Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981).
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§8 Modification of the law of warranties in products cases- Implied
warranties
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particu-
lar purposes were taken from Roman law and incorporated into the
English and American law of sales in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.3 0 The notion of fitness included that of safety,
but recovery was first limited to purchasers in immediate privity with
the seller. However, the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., held that the Chrysler Corporation, though only con-
tracting directly with the dealer, was responsible to the ultimate pur-
chaser. 3 1 In the Uniform Commercial Code (§2-313 through §2-315)
liability beyond the original purchaser was contemplated and several
alternatives (A, B and C) given to States adopting it. The alternative
most commonly adopted is A, which limits liability to family and
household guests32. The manufacturer or seller is not allowed to dis-
claim this liability. Alternative B allows recovery by any foreseeable
natural person (i.e. not a corporation) but for personal injuries only.
Alternative C, the broadest of all, allows recovery even by corporations
and includes damage to property as well as personal injury. The prin-
cipal modification of UCC provisions as they apply in products liabil-
ity cases are:
1. Severe limitations on disclaimers. Sellers are generally not
allowed (under the unconscionability clauses of the UCC itself ) to
disclaim implied warranties when they relate to personal injury or
property damage. The ability of suppliers to disclaim implied warran-
ties has also been severely limited by federal statutes notably the Mag-
nusson-Moss Act, that among other things will not allow suppliers to
make any affirmative statements about their products if they are dis-
claiming the usual implied warranties (they cannot talk out of both
sides of their mouth at the same time). 33
2. Relaxation of the notice requirement. Implied warranties under
the UCC have proved awkward in products law because notice of any
30. This work was initiated by Chief Justice Holt and Lord Mansfield in the Court
of King's Bench in London and later developed by Chief Justice Joseph Story, Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts, and other distinguished commercial authors in
America. Both Mansfield and Story were well versed in Roman Civil Law.
31. 161 A.2d 269 (NJ. 1960). Prosser describes this case as the point where the
walls of the privity defense in negligence cases finally came down.
32. See UCC §2-318 Alternative A. In North Carolina, workers not covered by
Workers' Compensation may also sue under the Products Liability Statute N.C. GEN.
STAT. §99B.
33. 15 U.S.C.A §2301-2312.
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defect must be given to the manufacturer within a reasonable period of
time, which may be as little as six months following delivery. This is a
very reasonable requirement between traders who complain about sub-
standard goods, but six months is generally insufficient time to allow
personal injury complaints to mature. The decision to seek compensa-
tion may properly be delayed beyond the commercially appropriate
date and in many cases the injury will not be discernible or the result-
ing disabilities may not have become completed until several years
after purchase. For example, a defective conducting rod may not be
struck by lightning for many years after delivery. The requirement of
early notice under the UCC has therefore been generally held not to
apply in personal injury or damage to property (other than the goods
sold) and the normal limitation period for torts actions is deemed to
apply.
3. The privity requirements of the UCC. If one of the restricted
privity options in UCC §2-319 has been chosen by the jurisdiction,
privity requirements are not usually relaxed in products cases. Thus
in the celebrated North Carolina case of Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son,
Inc.,3 the injured plaintiff did not satisfy the privity provisions of
either the UCC or the Products Liability Act 35 and so could not
recover.
§9 Modification of the common law notion of strict liability -
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
The three causes of action just mentioned, namely negligence,
express warranty and implied warranty, provide reasonable cover for
products liability cases. Nevertheless, they had been developed, in a
somewhat uncoordinated manner, from older remedies-a process that
almost inevitably entails some confusion. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts (R2, published in 1965, therefore provided a new remedy
called "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer". This section essentially provides that:
(1) one who is in the business and
(2) who puts into the stream of commerce a product that is
(3) defective and unreasonably dangerous
(4) is liable to the ultimate user or consumer
(5) for personal injury and property damage proximately caused
by the defect
(6) without proof of negligence on the part of the supplier
34. 106 N.C. App. 324, 416 S.E.2d 924 (1992).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. §99B-1 et seq.
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(7) even though there was no privity between the supplier and the
injured person, provided that
(8) the item is expected to and does reach the user without sub-
stantial change and
(9) is used as intended. 36
Although strict liability for defective products is often described
as a new remedy it is actually an adaptation of an older remedy, the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. 37 In Rylands, strict liability was imposed
on defendants for keeping dangerous entities (such as collections of
water, dangerous animals or explosives) on their property exposing
their neighbors to unreasonable risk of harm. 38 As with other older
remedies, some changes were required for strict liability to work in the
products field. These changes have not always been appreciated by
courts applying §402A. For instance, the holding that ordinary fault 39
on the part of the plaintiff was no bar to recovery in strict liability has
been interpreted to mean that any evidence of user fault, other than
assumption of the risk, was inadmissible in products cases.40 This
kind of thinking is now generally considered inappropriate. The other
modification has been to remove the defense that the use of the prod-
uct was considered normal for the area and circumstances in which
the accident took place. If this facet of the rule were retained, one
could not be held strictly liable for injuries due to the use of automo-
biles, since their use is normal in our society.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A was quickly and enthusiasti-
cally adopted by most jurisdictions in the United States. A number of
good policy reasons seemed to support this wholesale adoption of the
new rule. Defective products are almost inevitable in modern manu-
facturing, even when great care has been exercised by the producers
and suppliers, and injuries arising from such defects are to be
expected. It was thought that strict liability (the common name for
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (1965).
37. 3 H.L 350 (1868).
38. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3.H.L. 350 (1868), extended already existing strict liability
for dangerous animals, explosives and poisons to unreasonably dangerous entities
introduced into the defendant's land. This liability has been further extended to cover
unreasonably dangerous activities off the defendant's premises (See R2 §§ 519, 520),
but very few cases have been litigated and even fewer have allowed recovery.
39. "Ordinary fault" in the common law was defined as simple failure to detect the
danger. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (reported in Prosser, Wade and
Schwartz, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS p.586 (10th ed. 2000)).
40. See Restatement (Third) Torts - Products Liability §17 cmt. a, for a full
discussion of this issue which is now overwhelmingly decided in favor of applying
comparative fault in strict liability cases.
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liability under §402A), would make it easier for injured users to
recover, and this in turn would motivate manufacturers to reduce risks
as far as possible. Finally, it seemed clear that the cost of compensa-
tion could be covered by insurance and spread among users by the
suppliers and manufacturers as part of the purchase price.41
§10 Second thoughts on §402A
Initially, the strict liability section of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts seemed obviously fair to all parties and there seemed to be no
difficulty as to how it should be applied. But problems soon began to
appear and they have not gone away.
1. Insurance rates began to rise sharply. There has been a good
deal of argument as to the cause, but some of the blame was attributed,
rightly or wrongly, to strict liability provisions and they have come
under attack from business interests. Large corporations are thought
to have played a major role here, but the insurance burden has been
hardest on the smaller manufacturers and suppliers, who represent a
very large and politically influential part of the business community,
and they have been able to make their objections heard.42
2. Probably more importantly, §402A has proved to be unclear as
to its meaning. It has been interpreted in different ways in various
jurisdictions.43 The difficult questions flowing from § 402A include
the following:
a. Should the strict liability provisions of §402A apply only to man-
ufacturing defects or to cover design and packaging defects as
well.
It seems likely that Dean Prosser, the principal reporter, intended
only manufacturing defects to come under this section with matters of
design dealt with as ordinary negligence, but this was not made clear
in the Restatement. The arguments in favor of limiting strict liability to
41. The policies supporting R2T §402A have been enunciated and discussed in
many cases. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
42. The principal evidence of this is the "sellers exception" where the ultimate
vendor is no longer liable under warranty without fault. This provision is included in
§105.C of the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (MUPLA) and in the products
liability reform legislation in most jurisdictions.
43. The great German jurist Christian Von Savigny would no doubt
comment-from the grave - "I told you so." Savigny was very doubtful of the ability of
legislation to provide clear definitions and rules ex cathedra in new circumstances. He
would have confined the province of legislation in civil cases to summarizing or
perhaps clarifying judicially developed materials, and even here he preferred the
authoritative text-book.
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STRICT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE GOODS
APPLIED TO ALL TYPES OF DEFECT
INCLUDING DEFECTIVE DESIGN
THE "USER EXPECTATION TEST"
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK IS A DEFENSE BUT THE
DECISION MUST BE CLEARLY UNREASONABLE I
MISUSE, ALTERATION AND ABUSE ARE DEFENSES BUT
MAY BE FORESEEABLE AND THUS CREATE LIABILITY
41
SINCE FAULT IN THE DEFENDANT IS CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT, THEN THE CONTRIBUTORY FAULT OF THE
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE EQUALLY SO IF IT FALLS SHORT
OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
Illustration 2: Expansive interpretations
of Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A
manufacturing defects are listed by a number of learned authors who
point out that:
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i. The design process is well documented so that fault can be found
and clearly proved.
ii. Design defect cases, though costly to prepare and try, generally
involve many plaintiffs with serious injuries so that expense is not
a serious deterrent to bringing suit.
iii. Since a whole line of products is being considered, a design
should not be declared defective without a good deal of thought.
The merits and demerits of alternative designs should be weighed
very carefully and all other options considered before consigning
a design already in production to the scrap heap.
b. Should plaintiff fault be a defense?
It was argued, and some courts accepted the argument, that since
negligence on the part of the defendant need not be shown, and due
care on the part of the defendant is not a defense, then the plaintiff's
fault should likewise be irrelevant. This argument was considered
doubtful from the beginning as it seemed designed to encourage user
fault as a matter of public policy. Even when it was accepted, user
fault tended to be viewed under some other heading, such as causation
or misuse.
c. How do you decide when a product is defective?
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a defective product as
one that does not perform as a reasonable user would expect. Some
writers have described a defective item as one that a reasonable pro-
ducer would not sell.4 4 There is probably no difference between these
formulae.45 The key term is the word "reasonable." The reasonable
buyer and seller, unlike the rest of us, must be superhuman, knowing
all there is to know about the product and how it might have been
properly designed, manufactured and packaged. The user expecta-
tions test, apparently a simple and even a lay notion, turns out then to
be a rather complicated artificial construct, which is more likely to
confuse than to help the jury. The ordinary reasonable buyer may be
required to struggle with and attempt to understand all sorts of techni-
cal details concerning design, production and marketing before decid-
ing whether a product is defective or not.
44. Compare Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30 (1973) withJ. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5 (1965).
45. Id.
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Illustration 3: Liability for Manufacturing Defects
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PART 11l-THE EMERGING CONSENSUS IN MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW
§11 Objective definitions of defect - Uniform Products Liability Act and
Restatement (Third) of Torts
The conceptual problems just mentioned have not eliminated the
use of the Restatement (Second) Torts §402A, but they have signifi-
cantly reduced the boundaries of its operation. It continues to func-
tion reasonably well in manufacturing defects cases (where it was
hardly needed in the first place, since defect here normally implies
fault somewhere). But it is not apt for use in design and warnings
defects that inevitably sound in negligence. Relics of its expansive
phase, when it was extended to cover all products cases, remain here
and there, but they are like the shattered fragments of Ozymandias'
statue in the desert sand, the remains of former glory.46 Lip service
may be paid to it in a statement of claim or judicial opinion here and
there, but it has been largely replaced by an emerging consensus of
authorities and jurisdictions on products liability that has developed
over the last several decades. Even where it is still used it has been
interpreted out of existence.47 The judge will say "strict liability is the
law in this jurisdiction; but so far as defective design or defective warn-
ings are concerned it means -- (and a statement sounding largely in
negligence follows)." 48
The new thinking can be seen in the Model Uniform Products
Liability Act (MUPLA) 49 and in the Restatement (Third) of Torts on
products liability (R3T-PL). ° Neither of these two influential publica-
tions even mentions such terms as negligence, warranty or strict liabil-
ity. They link liability to one of two things-either to representations
46. Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias, A CONCISE TREASURY OF GREAT POEMS
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN p. 420 (1942).
47. This is not to say that §402A is worthless. The comments contain valuable
materials, still much quoted as authorities.
48. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 447. A review of the law in various
jurisdictions can be found in the Restatement (Third) Torts - Products Liability §2
cmt. d.
49. Produced by a federal interagency task force established by the Ford
administration and chaired by Professor Victor Schwartz. Its report was published in
November 1977.
50. Published in 1998 by the American Law Institute. The reporters were
Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, both recognized authorities in the
products liability field.
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made by the defendant 51 or to a defect of some kind in the article sold.
No attempt is made to define "defect" in general terms. In place of a
single overall notion (the reasonable user test), particular objective def-
initions are supplied for each of the three (or four)5 2 types of defect.
§12 Types of defect
Defects are divided into manufacturing defects, design defects and
packaging defects. Each of these must be described in some detail.
1. Manufacturing defects
Manufacturing defects are defied as those where the product was
not made as designed-a bolt was left out, substandard materials were
inadvertently used or some of the components accidentally mis-
matched.5 3 A second method of defining a manufacturing defect is
where the item in question does not match the others in the same
product line. The first definition is preferable, although it may be sim-
pler in some cases to show variance from the blueprint by comparing
the defective article with normal products made from the same design.
Defects of this type may be obvious even to the layperson, but in cata-
strophic accidents it may be difficult, or even impossible, to determine
if the defect caused the accident or the accident caused the defect. In
such cases rather loose circumstantial inferences may be allowed. So
when a recently purchased car swerves suddenly off the road in good
driving conditions without any suggestion of driver fault, the jury may
be allowed to conclude that the automobile was somehow defective,
even when severe damage removes any hope of showing a faulty part.
54
This is sometimes referred to as the "malfunction" rule.
2. Design defects
A design defect is defined and proved by showing a safer, feasible,
alternative design.5 5 Proving that a better design is possible is not an
easy matter. It is not enough to show that the item could have been
designed in a way that would have prevented a particular accident.
51. Liability for representations made is still termed express warranty, though this
may require rethinking due to the fact that such representation can create liability in
other ways, such as inducing carelessness in the user
52. The fourth being liability under express warranty which features in MUPLA
but is largely ignored in R3T-PL.
53. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §2(a) (1998).
54. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §3 (1998).
55. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §2(b) (1998).
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The crucial term here is feasible and feasibility has a number of
components."
a. It must be possible to build the new features into the design with
currently available materials and technology.57
This requirement is sometimes difficult to define precisely, but
three basic methods are used which are described in order of
preference.
i. If the proposed better design is already incorporated in compara-
ble products little argument can be made about whether it is feasi-
ble or not. In fact, a showing of this kind is likely to raise a strong
presumption of defective design, which must be rebutted to avoid
liability.58
ii. If a safety device or feature is available so that it might have been
incorporated into the design, the proposed safer design was argua-
bly feasible. However, the argument is not quite so strong as in
item i. supra, since the new device may have unsuspected adverse
effects when incorporated into a product for the first time. The
inference of feasibility may therefore be rebutted by pointing out
this fact, and by documenting some of the unwanted effects that
might occur if it was used in this unprecedented way.
iii. The third and weakest form of feasibility argument is to show that
a safety feature could be produced and incorporated into the
design using available technology even though no one has actu-
ally done so. This is open, a fortiori, to arguments that it might
not function as hoped within the proposed new design, the new
device might not perform up to expectation, or may have nasty,
unsuspected drawbacks of one sort or another.
b. The redesigned item should perform reasonably well.
Ideally, it should equal or surpass the performance of the unsafe
model that it is intended to replace. For instance, a flexible wheel
cover to keep mud off the brakes in a heavy earthmover may be desira-
56. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825 (1973), was used as a model by the court in Troja v. Black & Decker, 488 A.2d
516 (Md. 1987).
57. This gives rise to what is known as the "state of the art" defense. Some writers,
and a few jurisdictions, have taken the position that an article is just as defective and
just as dangerous if it lacked a safety feature known at the time of the accident, even if
this was not available at the time of manufacture. This form of strict liability has
generally been rejected as going beyond strict to absolute liability. See Restatement
(Third) of Torts - Products Liability cmt. d. (1998).
58. Such cases would almost certainly be settled. If contested, it will be argued that
the model shown with the safety feature already included is not really comparable to
the one in dispute, being more expensive or designed for a different purpose or with
some other differentiating characteristic.
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ble, but if, with currently available materials, it cannot withstand the
heat of the brakes, the improvement is a futuristic dream, not a feasible
alternative design. Similarly a wire cover over a propeller in a fishing
boat may prevent it from wounding fishermen who fall into the water,
but if it produces so much drag that the boat will be very slow and
have very high gas consumption the alternative is not feasible.5 9
c. The changes should not be too costly.
A completely crash-worthy car could probably be produced but
the suggested design will not be considered feasible if it would price
the vehicle beyond the pocket of all but the very rich. Cost considera-
tions, of course, must be related to the nature and purchase price of
the article: an increase of a hundred dollars may be trivial in an auto-
mobile but out of the question in a domestic kitchen item such as a
mixer. Cost effectiveness must also be related to the quality of the
item. Most articles, including cars, come in several qualities with price
tags higher on those at the upper end of the market. The level of safety
design will always have a general minimum standard, but beyond this
point improvements should not be allowed to price the item beyond
the purchasing ability of all but the wealthy. A luxury Cadillac and a
Ford car at the lower end of the price scale are not comparable items.
d. The new model should be reasonably acceptable to purchasers.
It is not sensible to insist on a product that most users dislike or
find disagreeable. They should, in time at least, come to like the
improved product as well as or better than the older item. A safer
cleansing cream that smells peculiar or causes a burning sensation in
the skin will hardly be considered a feasible alternative product to one
that has potentially allergic ingredients but is effective and agreeable to
the users.
e. The alternative design should not create new dangers that might
be just as bad or worse than the old ones.
To replace one dangerous design with another would be "out of
the frying pan and into the fire." Salk polio vaccine employs killed
virus and so does not cause the rare case of polio infection that is
associated with live attenuated (Sabin) virus. It can, however, cause a
rare but devastating encephalitis and so is not really any safer than the
Sabin vaccine. 60
59. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
60. This point was overlooked by the court in Reyes v. Wyeth, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th
Cir. 1974), where a little girl contracted polio following ingestion of oral vaccine. The
manufacturers objected that the parent of the child had no reasonable alternative
during a polio epidemic so that a warning about the remote possibility of contracting
the disease from the cure was irrelevant. The court (introducing its own researches
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It is clear from the above considerations, that even designing for
safety alone may be very difficult and involve trade-offs and choices
that are not easy for lay persons to understand. It has been argued, by
Professor James Henderson and others, that design cases, where the
ultimate design was deliberately selected after considering the pros
and cons of the alternatives, are not suitable for submission to a jury.61
The fear is that, being unable to understand the design arguments of
the experts, the lay jurors may make their decision on some other
grounds, such as who seemed the best expert, whether they liked the
plaintiff or not, and (apparently a most important factor) how badly
the plaintiff was injured. A number of highly respected judges have
been impressed with this argument but few, if any, have felt free to go
along with it. 6
2
What has been done, however, is to require that plaintiffs in
design cases prove their case and really show alternative feasible safer
design. The Daubert criteria for expert testimony should also work to
the same end, excluding partisan experts who might be hired to testify
for or against a particular design (junk science).63 Trying design cases
properly in this way usually requires a number of experts and is there-
fore extremely expensive and work-intensive, which effectively bars the
claims of all but the most severely injured whose recovery would jus-
tify the expense. It has, however, the advantage that once accom-
plished, the result can be used as a pattern and an incentive to settle
other cases where people or property have been injured by the same
design.
§13 Packaging or marketing defects - defective warnings and
instructions
The term "packaging defect" is unfortunate since it suggests that
there is something wrong with the wrappings, bottles or containers in
without cross-examination by counsel or benefit of expert opinion) noted that the Salk
vaccine was available, that it avoided the risk of infecting the patient and that the
parent might have decided to prefer it. The risk of encephalitis from the Salk vaccine
was not mentioned.
61. J.A. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choice: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
62. See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1981).
63. See Daubert v. Dow Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Here
the Federal Rules of Evidence were declared to replace the older Frye criteria
(acceptable to a respectable body of scientific opinion) with the rule that the court had
to find proposed expert testimony both relevant and reliable before it could be
presented to the jury.
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which the product is packaged. A packaging defect 64 in the products
liability context means that there is something wrong with the warn-
ings and instructions accompanying the article. A packaging defect
exists when:
1. There is a non-obvious danger, AND
2. There is either no warning (or safety instructions) at all, OR
3. More adequate warnings (or safety instructions) could and
should have been provided that would have prevented or reduced the
severity of the harms.
A packaging defect is proved by demonstrating that a more ade-
quate warning of the non-obvious danger was reasonably feasible.65
This is similar (though easier and less expensive in practice) to show-
ing a safer alternative feasible design. The general rule is that when
warnings are appropriate they should be communicated directly to
those most in need of warnings, the foreseeable actual users. An
exception occurs when an intervening person (the responsible inter-
mediary or the learned intermediary) has the duty to pass on and
interpret any warnings and instructions that have been provided. This
commonly occurs in medical practice where warnings about medica-
tions are supplied to the prescribing physicians who are expected to
interpret them to the patients.66 It can also be found in the work set-
ting, where employers, or their safety officers, may have the duty of
passing on warnings and safety instructions to employees.67
However, an exception to this notion will be recognized and the
learned intermediary defense will not be available when:
1. The danger to the ultimate user is great, AND
2. The intermediary may fail to perform their duty, AND
3. It is feasible to provide a warning directly to the ultimate user.
The first two conditions are usually present in every case, since
the case would hardly arise unless the danger was considerable and all
intermediaries, being human, are fallible. It is therefore clearly ones
duty to deliver warnings/instructions to the ultimate user in every case
where it is reasonably feasible to do so, e.g. by embossing them on the
article or in some other way.
64. Sometimes also termed a "marketing defect."
65. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §2(c).
66. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §6(d).
67. All sorts of persons may act as a learned intermediary, as where the
manufacturer of ski bindings would be required to depend of the renter of the ski
equipment to make sure that the bindings matched the ski boots. See Persons v.
Salomon N. Am., Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1990).
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Illustration 6: Adequate and Inadequate Warnings
and Accepting the Obvious Danger Rule
§14 Packaging defects - adequate and inadequate warnings
Warnings and safety instructions must be distinguished from
instructions for use. Warnings spell out danger and safety instruc-
tions tell you how to avoid the danger. Ordinary instructions are
merely directed towards effective use.
Warnings/instructions, if given, must be adequate. A cursory
statement such as "use only as directed" will not normally be suffi-
Danger clearly --- Ye
and specifically
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! ! .
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cient. If there is a danger, then the nature of the danger, its magnitude,
and the measures to be adopted if the danger materializes must all be
clearly communicated to the user in order to constitute a sufficient
warning. The nature of a sufficient warning is perhaps best treated by
discussing some well-known rules.
1. No need to warn of what everybody should know.
This rule is based on a sound principle, but unfortunately it is not
always clear what everyone may reasonably be expected to know. Com-
mon knowledge varies with time and circumstance. It also varies with
the qualifications of the person. Experts are expected to know a great
deal more than ordinary users; for example a miner does not need to
be warned of the dangers of dynamite. The non-expert is more prob-
lematic; there is some difficulty in determining how much knowledge
a visitor from a foreign country, or one with diminished mental capa-
bilities is presumed to have.
2. No need to warn of what the plaintiff actually knows.
Here again we have an obviously sound principle, but the reasona-
ble person is allowed to have lapses of memory-for even Homer nods
off sometimes (etiam Homer nodat).68 Conflicts between these two
opposing principles can produce differences in rule application. If
someone can forget what ze know they can also forget the warning, but
a warning might jog the memory and prevent an inadvertent slip. Con-
sequently it may not be pointless to display a warning on the product,
even if it is something that many or most people know.
3. No need to warn of obvious dangers.
The first element in defining warning is usually the requirement
that the danger be non-obvious. The obviousness of a danger has been
used as an affirmative defense in design defect cases. The purchaser
or user of a punch press, which is clearly without safety devices, can-
not complain if they get their hand crushed in the machine. But here
too it must be remembered that the reasonable person can reasonably
forget. This rule must then be balanced with the next one that shows
the close relationship between packaging and design defects.
4. Good warnings do not excuse bad design.69
68. A medieval maxim deriving from some very peculiar passages in the Iliad,
which were most likely due to transcription errors rather than inattention on the part
of the poet.
69. This rule is relatively new and has not been ruled on in many jurisdictions, but
it is obviously reasonable and has been firmly approved and adopted in several
important cases as well as by most commentators. See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384
N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978); Eads v. R.D. Werner Co., 847 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1993);
Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §2 cmt. 1.
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Illustration 7: A More Current Version of Warnings Defects
It is easier to add a warning than to redesign for safety. However,
warnings are much less effective in preventing accidents than safety
devices. Manufacturers therefore may still be held liable, despite ade-
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quate warnings, if a feasible design change would have made the prod-
uct safer. The manufacturer's duty is first to design well, and then to
warn of latent defects that cannot reasonably be designed out.
5. Warnings must be prominent, legible and understandable.
Warnings do not provide adequate notice of danger if they are
tucked away in the depths of a brochure in small print. The more seri-
ous the potential harm, the more important it is that the warning
should be calculated to come to the notice of the user. This require-
ment is subject to the qualification of reasonableness, which is espe-
cially important nowadays since the increase in the bulk of warnings/
instructions has made it harder, perhaps even impossible, to warn
effectively.
6. Warnings will be presumed to have been read.
The manufacturers' duty to provide warnings is matched by the
users' duty to read them. Normally manufacturers are allowed to
assume that the user will read and follow the warnings and safety
instructions that they have provided. If, however, the manufacturer or
supplier has notice of the likelihood that the product will come into the
hands of illiterate or foreign users, then the manufacturer may have a
duty to take reasonable measures to inform such persons about the
danger. For example, a supplier of a toxic fertilizer was deemed to
have notice that migrant workers who did not understand the English
language might not be made aware of the dangers of their product and
be harmed by it. A duty arose to warn of the danger and how to avoid
it (by wearing a face mask). In such circumstances, internationally
agreed upon standard warning symbols may be helpful. 70
7. Warnings must be specific as to the nature of the danger.
A warning should not only apprise users of the danger but also
make them aware of its type, magnitude and urgency. A warning that
a vapor may be harmful in a poorly ventilated room will not be suffi-
cient if the truth is that quite small concentrations of it can explode or
cause liver toxicity or some other serious medical problem. 71
8. Multiplying warnings diminishes their effect.
This is sometimes expressed in the comment that "warnings are
not free." It may cost only pennies to print an additional warning on a
label or package, but there can be other costs. Every additional warn-
ing dilutes and diminishes the effectiveness of the previous ones, until
eventually they have little or no effect at all. This principle is seen in
70. See Warren A. Seavey, Negligence - Subjective or Objective, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1927).
71. This is probably the most common ground for determining that warnings are
insufficient. See e.g., Tesmer v. Rich Ladder Co., 380 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1986).
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drug manufacturing, where if more than a few episodes of a particular
complaint are associated with a product, whether the drug is known to
have caused them or not, the manufacturer may feel obliged to list that
complaint as a possible side effect of the drug.72 It is not hard to see
that if a drug has been on the market for any length of time its warning
list is likely to become somewhat long and rather non-specific. It is
argued that a shorter list of the most likely problems would be more
helpful to the users. Allergy warnings are particularly troublesome in
this regard. Formerly an allergy was regarded as a defect in the user
rather than in the product. More recently manufacturers have been
held liable for not warning of possible allergic effects when they are
very common or even when they are rare if they are very serious.73
This means that an allergy warning must appear on virtually every
drug package insert, since anything can cause serious allergic
problems to some person somewhere. It does not make much sense
then to put an allergy warning in the list of possible side effects of a
drug. A more helpful approach is to list any ingredients that are
known to cause allergic reactions: persons who are allergic to these
substances may then be able to avoid them. Nitrites, used as preserva-
tives in restaurant salad bars are a good example. They can, when
ingested, cause fatal anaphylactic reactions in some people and it is
very desirable that such people should know if nitrites have been used
in the preparation or preservation of a food item. Similarly most of the
serious skin reactions to creams and rinses are caused by approxi-
mately fifteen naturally occurring substances used as preservatives,
spreading agents or emulsifiers.74 It makes sense to notify potential
users if these substances are present in cosmetics. It does not make
sense to put a blanket warning on every product that it may cause
serious allergies.
§15 Residual clause - some other topics in products liability
There are a number of other items that normally appear in texts
dealing with products liability. Some of these represent interactions
with other areas of the law, such as workers' compensation or corpora-
72. There is no fixed number of adverse reports that will require a warning.
However, the litigation-averse drug manufacturer will rather quickly consult with the
FDA about including a warning in the package materials.
73. Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prod., 231 N.E.2d 294 (N.Y. 1969).
74. Lists of common allergens are published by the prestigious North American
Contact Dermatitis Group (NACDG), representing experts in this field in the U.S. and
Canada. They have also developed diagnostic kits for detecting these allergies.
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tions. It is outside the scope of this article to deal with them in any
detail, but a brief list with limited discussion follows.
1. Liability for used goods.
The general rule here is that there is only liability for actual negli-
gence, especially if the article is sold "as is."75 Actual notice of a defect
may create the duty to inform the purchaser, especially if it relates to
safety. A duty to inspect for defects may also create liability. If the
article is advertised as "reconditioned," some jurisdictions will hold
the seller liable as if it were new, while others, more kindly to the
seller, will only apply the warranty of merchantability (and safety) to
any new parts installed as replacements.7 6
2. Liability of assemblers and suppliers of components.
Assemblers of articles are liable for all defects in the product as it
leaves their hands even if the defects were in component parts, such as
tires, supplied by someone else. The manufacturers and suppliers of
defective components are liable to the assembler and can also be
directly sued by the plaintiff in negligence, but only in negligence since
strict liability does not usually apply to component parts. Component-
related defects can occur when there is nothing wrong with the compo-
nent itself, i.e. it is only dangerous because of the way it functions in
the assembled product. For example, brakes of a particular type may
not be suitable for the vehicle in which they are installed. The compo-
nent suppliers are only liable in these circumstances if they were
involved in the design of the final product.77 Liability of the compo-
nent supplier will depend on a number of factors:
a. Whether or not they had notice of the use to be made of their
component.
b. Whether consultation had taken place between the component
supplier and the assembler.
c. Whether there was notice that the assembler was relying on the
advice of the component supplier.
d. The relative expertise of the final assembler. Even though consul-
tation has taken place and advice sought and given, the expert
knowledge and experience of the assembler may supersede and
insulate the component supplier.78
75. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 110.
76. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §8.
77. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §8(b).
78. See Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3rd Cir. 1978). The factors which
may create liability for a components supplier are clearly listed and discussed in this
landmark case.
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Factor based decisions, such as the one just mentioned, can be
assisted by logical devices. The factors can be number-weighted on a
scale of "0-1-2" depending on whether they are absent, doubtfully pre-
sent, or definitely present. If the component supplier simply for-
warded the parts requested the total score would be "0" and would
indicate no liability. If the assembler did not know whether or which
component would work in the final product and asked the supplier to
advise and recommend, the score would be "2." The minimum
summed score would be 0 and would indicate no liability on the part
of the component supplier. The maximum summed score would be 8
and the component supplier would probably be liable as a matter of
law. Scores in between these extreme numbers would at some point,
perhaps from "3" to "5," raise a matter upon which reasonable persons
might differ, i.e. a jury question.
3. Liability of those who endorse products.
Organizations such as Good Housekeeping and Underwriter's
Laboratories can be liable only for negligence, e.g., inadequate test-
ing. 79 They can also be liable for failure to test since this may amount
to misrepresentation; they did not test as they represented themselves
to have done. Celebrities who promote a product endorse it in a man-
ner of speaking, but are not generally held liable for its defects. The
rationale for this holding is probably that the public is deemed aware
that these celebrities know nothing about the product and are merely
selling their name for a fee. Franchisers and licensors who allow their
name or trademark to be associated with a product may, however, be
liable in warranty or in strict tort for the products and enterprises
which bear their name on the ground of apparent authority-they seem
to be the owners and may be estopped from denying it.8 °
4. Liability of publishers.
Publishers and booksellers are generally not liable for defective
products advertised in their magazines, or for harmful recommenda-
tions in the text. 81 The analogy to freedom of the press has been men-
tioned in justification of this rule, but the principle involved here really
has nothing to do with defamation or the right to free speech. It relates
to the difficulty that it would cause publishers if they had to perform
an accuracy check on every advertisement and statement made in their
books and magazines.8 2
79. Hanberry v. Hearst, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
80. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 104.
81. See Winter v. Putnam, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
82. The presence of actual knowledge of falsehood on the part of the publisher
raises interesting and difficult questions which are beyond the scope of this article.
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5. Liability of successor corporations.
By taking over an existing company, one may thereby unwittingly
become the defendant in a products liability suit that had not been
filed at the time of purchase. Two competing policies are at work here.
On the one hand, it does not seem proper that injured users of these
products should have no recourse when the original manufacturer
fades from the scene. On the other hand, discouraging the purchase
and take-over of companies would have serious economic conse-
quences, including the fact that a number of them would go into bank-
ruptcy and be unavailable for suit anyway. There are some exceptions
that considerably reduce the scope of this rule. The successor corpora-
tion will be held liable when:
a. The purchasing corporation has expressly or impliedly assumed
the seller's liability.
b. When the consolidation is deemed a merger.
c. When the purchasing company is considered to be a continuation
of the original manufacturing corporation.
d. When the purchase is fraudulent and aimed at avoiding
liabilities.8 3
6. Liability of employers insured under Workers' Compensation
Acts.
The liability of the insured employer is limited to the amount
imposed by the Worker's Compensation statute. Attempts to circum-
vent the exclusivity of these remedies may be made in a number of
ways.
a. The injured worker may sue the employer outside the workers'
compensation provisions for an intentional tort. This will nor-
mally mean that the employee forfeits the no-fault workers' com-
pensation, but recovery is then not limited to the workers'
compensation amount. Some jurisdictions will allow the injured
worker to bring suit against their employer where the latter has
been found not merely to be at fault but to have shown gross fault
amounting to recklessness.8 4 Most jurisdictions, however, will dis-
courage this exception, in some cases to the point of making it
impossible to show intent.8 5 Others allow the action but distin-
Liability might arise, but there is an understandable reluctance to require publishers to
rewrite their authors' books and articles.
83. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
84. See Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio
1982).
85. See Johns-Manville Prod. v. Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948, 953 (Cal. 1980),
where the employer knowingly withheld information about an unsafe working
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guish the requisite "recklessness" shown from even extreme negli-
gence. The employer must have knowledge amounting to
substantial certainty that injury is likely to occur yet still going
ahead in callous disregard of the danger threatening the worker.8 6
Some limitations on the right to sue the employer for intentional
harm have been included in Tort Reform Statutes. These formula-
tions have survived constitutional challenge in some jurisdictions
and been struck down in others.87
b. The worker may also sue the supplier of defective machinery that
caused zes injuries. This third party may then attempt to obtain
contribution from an employer whose negligence substantially
contributed to the harm. The general rule is that contribution in
these circumstances is not permitted.88 The need to maintain the
exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation system will outweigh
the interest of the third party supplier.
c. The employer may also "step outside" Workers' Compensation
immunity by becoming a manufacturer and supplier to zes own
business (the "dual capacity" doctrine). To become liable the
employer must manufacture equipment as a separate enterprise.
Manufacturing machinery for use in one's own business is not
enough. Recent case law has tended to severely limit the dual
capacity doctrine and some would even doubt its continued
existence.8 9
Another controversial area in Workers' Compensation is the appli-
cation of the collateral sources doctrine in lawsuits by workers against
third party suppliers. Traditionally this has been regarded as a benefit
that workers have provided for themselves, and which should not be
used to reduce their recovery. One exception to this is that insurance
contracts normally have a subrogation clause that allows the insurer to
environment from the workers and was still held not to have acted intentionally in
terms of the Workers' Compensation Act. To allow the action outside the Act, the court
said "would undermine the underlying premise upon which the workers'
compensation system is based."
86. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 46.
87. The West Virginia Legislature defined "intentional" for purposes of workers
compensation as acting "with a consciously, subjectively and deliberately formed
intention to produce the specific - injury or death to the employee." W. Va. Code §23-
4-2. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 47, for discussion of this battle
between legislatures and courts.
88. New York is the main if not the only jurisdiction that permits third parties to
obtain compensation or indemnity from employers. See Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 9, at 53.
89. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 49.
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claim from the third party recovery, any amounts which they have paid
to the injured worker. Recent reform proposals, including those of
MUPLA, have tended to view the collateral sources rule as a fiction
with the reality being that the worker is being compensated twice for
the same injury.90 Some jurisdictions will allow the third party sup-
plier to deduct the amounts already paid to the injured employee under
workers' compensation. A tiny minority rule, only followed at present
in California and North Carolina, will allow deduction of the Workers'
Compensation amount by the third party defendant when the
employer has been at fault.9 ' This appears to be punishing the
employee for the faults of the employer, but a more complex rationale
may be at work. The subrogating insurance company is being penal-
ized here and presumably will raise the insurance rates of the negligent
employer.
PART IV PERSISTING PROBLEMS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
§16 Problem (1) - Fitting the modern notions into traditional remedies
Modern products liability law, as was noted earlier, was created by
adapting older remedies to modern circumstances. This produced a
number of causes of action covering the same kinds of cases. In prac-
tice there was little difference between these remedies. Implied war-
ranty of safety, suitably adapted, can operate much like strict liability,
and there is very little difference, if any, between negligence and strict
liability for design defects and failure to warn. But the continuing
presence of these various remedies in jury instructions can lead to con-
fusion in the minds of jurors who have been known to reach inconsis-
tent verdicts, e.g., finding no defect in a product and yet holding the
seller liable in negligence or warranty.9"
One of the most important goals in court procedure is to make the
issues being presented as clear as possible to jurors. It is therefore
good policy to avoid vagueness and confusion in jury instructions as
much as possible. The "modern" version of products liability does this
by ignoring the rather general notion of defect based on the user
expectation test that is found in Restatement (Second) of Torts. This is
replaced with a list of several different kinds of defect (manufacturing,
90. It is interesting that insurance providers have been willing to accept this,
apparently because the transaction costs of pursuing subrogation recoveries have
reached the point where the value of the effort is questionable. See Report of the
Interagency Study on Products Liability, published at 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (1979).
91. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 55.
92. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 62 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y 1995).
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design and warning defects) each of which is proved by showing cer-
tain objective elements. The action in negligence is not abolished, but
is reserved for those cases where actual fault can be shown on the part
of the supplier. The action in express warranty likewise remains,
either as a matter of contract or if the user is led to behave incautiously
by promotional materials, as tortuous misrepresentation. There is
now no good reason to continue to use multiple overlapping remedies
and when their use is often confusing. However, getting rid of these
historical anomalies has proved difficult; they are entrenched in case
law and in some cases are statutory. Replacing them can be like
unscrambling eggs. There is no simple solution to this problem but
some options are worth considering. The rational choice between
options may of course indeed vary by jurisdictions.
In the few states that have not adopted § 402A, there should be no
serious problem. If the case arises from a manufacturing defect, one
can simply take the traditional remedy and add an interpretative note
to the effect that negligence will be shown by deviation from intended
manufacturing standard. The cause of action would then be described
as negligence by reason of defective manufacture, and negligence
would be presumed on the showing of a defective article. The causes
of action in implied warranty can be dealt with in the same way. The
action under an express warranty should likewise create no difficulty.
The warranty may be proved using promotional materials either to
show a specific warranty, or to imply that it is safe to use the article in
a certain (dangerous) way, which is a kind of express warranty
anyway.
In states where § 402A was adopted judicially there should like-
wise be no significant problem. Indeed many if not most of these juris-
dictions have already taken care of the matter. It is not even necessary
to reverse the prior decision to adopt strict liability, it may simply be
reinterpreted. A common formula is to say that strict liability for
design defects is proved by showing an alternative safer feasible
design. This is usually followed up by lip service to §402A, comment-
ing that this reinterpretation is not a return to negligence doctrine,
since the focus is on the defective article, not on the person or persons
who produced it. The same procedure can be used to redefine packag-
ing (warnings) defects. No significant change is required for manufac-
turing defects since strict liability was originally designed for these
and functions reasonably well in this kind of case. The only real
change is to avoid the "user expectation" test and state that a manufac-
turing defect is shown either by comparing the defective article with
the blueprint or other normal items from the same production line.
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In states where § 402A was introduced by statute, the problem
may be more serious. Reversing the original statutory enactment may
be viewed as a political act aimed at favoring manufacturers and
adverse to the interests of users. It is very doubtful that strict liability
under §402A has made any difference to recoveries by users and has
only served to confuse the law, but political interests may view the
matter otherwise. This being so, statutory replacement may be a slow
and difficult route to travel. It may indeed be easier to reinterpret the
statute judicially along the lines suggested above, as most courts have
already done. The transition to modern notions can also be accom-
plished by focusing on the "unreasonably dangerous" part of the
§402A formula, comparing alternative designs to see if they provide a
safer feasible alternative.
One persistent statutory problem relates to the use of the implied
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to deal with
products liability cases. The cause of action based on the UCC
implied warranty of merchantability (§2-314) has been an important
remedy in the past, and details of the management of products cases
using the UCC are well established. If there is personal injury or dam-
age to goods other than the item sold, then there is a products liability
suit. If the damage is only to the item sold, then the problem is merely
commercial in nature. This is a simple and workable rule of thumb.
Unfortunately a great deal of other confusing legal material has grown-
up around the use of the UCC in products cases, introducing all sorts
of issues from user fault and privity to periods of limitation. These
confusions and complications were well exemplified in the case of
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., where the jury, probably confused by multi-
ple instructions in various causes of action, brought in clearly incon-
sistent verdicts.93 The late Professor Gary Schwartz, a major player in
the development of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, wrote to Professor
Richard Speidel, reporter to the drafting committee on Article 2 of the
UCC, suggesting that bringing products liability law in the various
jurisdictions into line with modern notions would be easier if the UCC
would either exclude any application to personal injury cases or alter-
natively, include a statement representing modern products law in the
text of the UCC itself.94 Neither of these alternatives has proved accept-
able to the UCC drafters, who argue that some (very few) states
depend largely on the UCC remedies in products cases, effectively
93. Denny, 62 N.E.2d at 730. See also Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, Inc., 106 N.C.
App. 324; 416 S.E.2d 924 (1992), where similar confusion may be found.
94. Professor Schwartz's letter is reproduced in the teachers manual of Henderson
& Twerski, supra note 11, at 243.
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using them as a form of strict liability. Four alternative suggestions
are made here, in increasing order of likelihood.
1. The UCC could exclude the use of the Code in products cases.
2. The UCC could include a set of modern products provisions
for states to adopt.
3. States could act on their own, amending their version of the
UCC, to adopt either option 1 or 2.
4. State courts could reinterpret the UCC formulations bringing
them in line with the objective notions of MUPLA and Restatement
(Third) of Torts - Products Liability. 95
Until something along these lines is done, the multiple competing
causes of action, which exist at present in most jurisdictions, will con-
tinue to cause confusion and produce results which are either inconsis-
tent, unjust, or both.
§17 Problem (2) - Establishing liability in the chain of distribution
Retailers have traditionally been held liable to the immediate pur-
chaser for defective products under UCC 2-314 (the implied warranty
of merchantability). The justification for this practice was that it
relieved the injured plaintiff of the difficult task of finding all the
appropriate defendants. It seemed simpler, and fairer for the local
merchant, who after all had profited by the sale of the goods, to "vouch
in" the wholesaler who in turn could involve the manufacturer or other
supplier. Currently this system is viewed as unnecessarily roundabout
and hard on the local merchant who, besides suffering considerable
annoyance and stress, is put to the expense of obtaining legal counsel
and may even lose reputation locally as the result of the trial. The
current trend in most jurisdictions is therefore to make the wholesaler
and local merchants immune from suit (absent their own fault) and
compel the plaintiff to proceed directly against the manufacturer.96
This immunity may however be lost in a number of circumstances:
95. This kind of interpretative problem can be expected to arise if, and perhaps
when, the new American Products Liability materials begin to be cited in jurisdictions
where the European Community Directive on Products Liability has been adopted by
statute. There is considerable support, especially among judges, for the more usable
objective definitions of defect that these sources contain. They appear to be in direct
conflict with the "user expectation test" of the EEC directive. But they could be
incorporated into the EEC provisions, as American jurisdictions have done, by saying
that the reasonable user would not purchase an article which had manufacturing,
design or warning defects, and going on to define these in objective terms.
96. See MUPLA §105 and N.C. GEN. STAT. §99B-2.
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Merchant
liable to user
Illustration 8: The Ultimate Seller's Exception to Liability
1. When the wholesaler or merchant is not a mere conduit but
assembles, tests or in some other way becomes responsible for the
product.
2. When the immediate or intermediate seller has notice of a
defect and fails to take appropriate action.
3. When the manufacturer is not available for suit due to bank-
ruptcy, being in a foreign country or for some other such reason.
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4. When the immediate seller either makes warranties of zes own
or takes over and adopts the manufacturer's warranties. This usually
occurs during over-enthusiastic selling, when the merchant steps
across the boundaries of puffing, producing reasonable customer reli-
ance and therefore warranting the product. It should be noted however
that merely explaining a warranty is not adopting it.
5. When the immediate seller selects and recommends an item as
being suitable for a special purpose. (as in UCC §2-315).
6. The immediate seller can be liable for misrepresentation, e.g.,
under Restatement (Second) of Torts §402B.
7. When sellers put their own name on a product they cease to be
mere conduits and are treated as manufacturers, even if that was their
only connection with its manufacture (NC courts have specifically
repudiated this kind of liability).9 7
The seller's exception is generally considered fair, and useful in
eliminating the expense, annoyance, and possible loss of reputation on
the part of the immediate seller who might have to defend a case where
it was entirely innocent. The problems of the innocent user created by
the sellers' exception are largely taken care of in the limiting provisions
quoted above. However, there are two sets of circumstances left uncov-
ered in this list, where an innocent plaintiff harmed by a clearly defec-
tive product may not recover. They are:
1. When a defendant only becomes insolvent after the seller has
been released from liability, by which time the plaintiff will also usu-
ally be barred by the statute of limitations.
2. When it cannot be determined where, in the chain of distribu-
tion, the defect was created. A typical example is the exploding bottle
case where the container was clearly defective since it should not have
shattered during ordinary handling by the plaintiff. If expert opinion
cannot show that the defect was present when the bottle was manufac-
tured, then it could have been caused at any point in its journey to the
ultimate handler. Prior to the development of the "seller's exception,"
the purchaser could have recovered from the merchant under the war-
ranty of merchantability in the Sale of Goods Act or the UCC. Today,
many states, generally by Statute, do not permit the plaintiff to recover.
Someone, who has been blinded or has lost the effective use of the
dominant hand, will then be without a remedy.
The (Third) Restatement of Torts-Products Liability offers a solu-
tion to each of these problems. First, in the event of late bankruptcy, it
97. Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 80 N.C. App. 224, 341 S.E.2d 40 (1986).
Sellers trademark on a shoe was insufficient to cause them to be treated as the
manufacturer.
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is suggested in the comments that the statute of limitations might be
tolled and the statutory period deemed to begin when the manufactur-
ing defendant declares bankruptcy. Presumably statutes of repose
might still be deemed applicable to prevent excessive and prolonged
uncertainty as to the identity of the liable defendants.
Second, when it cannot be determined where and when the defect
arose, R3T-PL allows that the injured person should be allowed to
recover from the ultimate seller. The plain wording of § 1 of R3T-PL
seems to be attempting to reverse the general trend, seen in the Model
Uniform Statute and also in the Common Sense Product Liability
Legal Reform Act of 1996, which is to release non-manufacturing
defendants from liability. It could however be taken in another and
more modest sense, as an amendment to and not an abolition of the
sellers' exception. This might be more likely to be acceptable since it is
only adding one more exception in addition to those already allowed.98
§18 Problem (3) - The almost impossible task of the plaintiff in proving
design defects
Traditional proof of negligent design is indeed a formidable obsta-
cle in the way of the injured plaintiff seeking recovery. And strict lia-
bility, moving from the idea of fault to the modern notion of defect,
has not really helped much. Defect must be proved by showing an
alternative safer feasible design. There are a number of ways of going
about this task, some easier than others.
1. Proof of defective design may be relatively simple in the case of
a "woops" design 99 defect where some aspect of design has been acci-
dentally overlooked, e.g. the fact that an automobile will be sold in
Northern Canada and driven in severe winter conditions. Comparing
the car with those normally marketed in the far north and identifying
the missing design features may then show defective design. The pro-
cess is similar to that used in showing manufacturing defects.
2. In the case of a conscious design choice, proof of superior
alternative design may be attempted by showing that certain desirable
features, especially safety features, are incorporated into the design of
comparable articles produced by competitors. This approach may not
be as open and shut as it appears. The competing article may be con-
sidered a higher-grade item compared with the one in question (a Cad-
illac as compared with a Ford Pinto) and so might be expected to have
98. See Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products Liability §1 cmt. e.
99. Professor James A. Henderson's term for a design defect which is the result of
simple oversight rather than conscious choice. They are sometimes called "drawing
board defects." See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 445.
[Vol. 25:1
44
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/1
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - EMERGING CONSENSUS
more safety features, the cost of which would be reflected in the price.
In short it must be shown that the two articles are comparable, which
may raise all sorts of difficult questions, since things can be alike in
one way and not in another.
3. Conscious design defect may be proved by showing that a suit-
able safety device is already available and that it could have been incor-
porated in the design.' ° This again is not an assured road to success.
If the device has never been incorporated into a similar article, then the
objection can be made that it might not work, or might have functional
disadvantages, or get rid of one danger only to increase the likelihood
of another. All of these possibilities might argue against its use. In
short this is a weaker argument for a design defect than the presence of
the safety device in a competing article of the same quality, where its
performance would already have been put to the test.
4. The final method, and the usual one, of proving design defect
is to show that using available technology, the article could have been
redesigned in a manner that would make it safer to use. This is seldom
an easy task and normally requires multiple experts. Engineers must
testify that it can be done and that the article will still function reason-
ably well. Safety engineers are required to show that it will reduce the
risks of the harm in question and not unduly increase the risks of
other harms. Economists must testify to calculate how much the new
feature will increase the cost of the article and marketing experts are
required to show that the new item will be acceptable and hopefully
attractive to purchasers.
This approach is obviously extremely expensive and labor inten-
sive. Very few plaintiffs have the means to finance such cases, there-
fore the cost must be carried by the plaintiffs' attorneys who will
recoup their expenditure and obtain their fees from the recovery, if
any, at the conclusion of the case. The arguments for and against the
contingency fee system are well known and inconclusive, especially
from the plaintiffs perspective. In their favor they allow plaintiffs'
causes to proceed that might otherwise fail for lack of financial sup-
port. To that extent they help the plaintiff. But on the other side, they
only benefit plaintiffs who have a considerable likelihood of a very
large recovery, in order to make the effort and cost of litigation worth-
while. All other cases will be effectively screened out.
Scholars and courts have devoted considerable thought and effort
to devising ways to ease the plaintiffs burden of proof, making litiga-
100. For example, a kill switch said to be available that would cut off the engine in a
boat if the operator's hand was removed from the tiller would be a conscious design
defect. See Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
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tion less expensive and recovery more likely. The most notable of
these is found in the California case of Barker v. Lull, where a two
pronged analysis was allowed.' 0 ' First, the plaintiff was allowed to
employ the "user expectation" test, and then, if the reasonable plaintiff
would not have purchased or used the product, the burden shifts to the
defendant. 10 2 The defendant can then rebut the presumption of defect
by presenting evidence that the risk/benefit ratio of the chosen design
made it reasonably safe for its intended uses. 10 3 Barker v. Lull, has not
been well received and has been restrictively interpreted even in the
California courts of first instance. 10 4 There are good reasons for
courts to have reservations about the user-expectation test and also
about interfering with the traditional rule that the plaintiff must prove
zes case. The reasonable user is not really an ordinary layperson, but a
hypothetical super-being who knows everything about the product.
The danger is that the jurors will not appreciate this and think that
they, as ordinary reasonable beings, can give an opinion about a
design defect with the knowledge they have. The occasions are rare
when a layperson, without benefit of expert opinion, can say with con-
fidence that a design is defective. 10 5 One might interpret Barker liber-
ally and say that a minimum of expert opinion, short of full proof of
design defect, might be sufficient to shift the full burden of proof over
to the defendant. But this is a significant departure from the common
law rule that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. This more casual
approach to expert testimony has also been made less acceptable by
the Daubert decision, 10 6 interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence in a
manner that casts the judge in the role of gatekeeper, rejecting any
expert evidence that is not considered relevant and reliable. This
means that both sides must face the possibility that their experts will
not be allowed to testify if the evidence that they are offering seems
101. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Where reportedly plaintiffs are ordinarily expected to come forward with
evidence of reasonable alternative design.
105. See Campbell v. General Motors, 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1984), where the plaintiff
was thrown from one of the seats facing sideways at the anterior end of a city bus
when the driver turned a corner at high speed. A photograph showing that there were
no hand rails near these seats was considered sufficient to raise a jury question,
though no expert was called to testify as to a design defect. Even this somewhat rare
case might be questioned since there was presumably some design choice about the
placing of these seats.
106. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
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suspicious to the presiding judge.10 7 In short, making a case of defec-
tive design is not likely to be easy in the near or foreseeable future, at
least in those cases where the design represents a conscious choice-
balancing one alternative against the others and selecting the one that
seems to represent the best available option.
There does not seem to be any reasonable alternative to requiring
full-blown proof in design defect cases at the present time. The system
is stacked against the plaintiff, especially if recovery is doubtful or
likely to be for less than a very large amount. This bias is likely to
remain with us for some time for a number of reasons.
1. Design cases call into question an entire line of products not
merely individual items. The economic consequences to the manufac-
turer are therefore infinitely greater than in the case of products with a
manufacturing defect.
2. These economic consequences do not merely affect the manu-
facturer of the article but are visited also on the community as a whole.
For instance, if a line of products is discontinued or priced out of the
market, a great many people may lose their jobs.
3. Putting design choices in jeopardy may also have the effect of
discouraging manufacturers from considering new designs, since
design related problems are more likely to surface during use with
novel items than with those that have been around long enough to have
the bugs worked out of them.
§19 Problem (4) - Design by jury
Another endemic problem in proving design defects is that there
is likely to be a battle of the experts. In the typical scenario, experts
will be produced by both sides, and the jury, presumably lay, will have
to decide which of the contradictory expert opinions to believe. Ide-
ally the jurors will have been able to follow the experts' arguments and
decide the matter on its merits. Realistically, jurors will decide, with-
out fully understanding them, which of the arguments seems to be bet-
ter. Jurors are likely to side with the expert who has explained zes view
better (the superior teacher) or, at worst, side with the one whom
looked honest and sincere. The path to a jury hearing is strewn with
obstacles, but once the plaintiff manages to get to the jury the chances
of a recovery are reasonably good with a severely injured and sympa-
thetic plaintiff. It is the general view of manufacturer defendants that
107. Judge Kozinski, rehearing Daubert, excluded, as suspicious, all evidence based
on studies undertaken after the expert had been engaged by either party. This is not a
scientific but a lay opinion. The studies might be excellent but were, nevertheless, not
going to be admitted into evidence.
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they cannot really win a jury trial: even if the jury finds for them they
have lost.108 The experience and the publicity are both so bad that
every effort will be made not to endure this process again. This might
seem to be a good result for a trial, but usually it is not. Typically,
manufacturers will withdraw the challenged article from the market
and be reluctant to introduce new articles for fear of litigation. 0 9 The
preferred option of defendants then is a directed verdict or better still
summary judgment. Unfortunately, most judges feel unable to take
the question from the jury so long as there is some foundation in fact
for the plaintiffs claim that there is an alternative safer feasible design.
This is a difficult decision, determining how much proof is needed to
defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Professor Aaron Twer-
ski has identified ten factors that might assist the court in this mat-
ter,1 10 but unfortunately like most lists of factors, there are no clear
instructions as to how it should be used to reach a decision. The effec-
tiveness of such decision-making devices could be improved either by
considering some items to be more important than others (a weighted
factor system) or by giving number values to each item (scored factor
system). Twerski's factors may accordingly be restated as follows and
divided into major and minor factors.
MAJOR FACTORS
1. Polycentricity: The various parts of the design are interrelated
so that any design change would require changes in other items. This
would mean that it would be very troublesome and probably costly to
make a change. It would also be difficult to be sure that the change
would result in an overall improvement.
2. Close risk-utility proof: The advantages and disadvantages of
the compared designs are evenly balanced.
3. State of the art: The alternative design may not be practically
feasible in light of the state of the art.
108. See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980) (discussed in §19
supra).
109. A good example here is the withdrawal of the appetite suppressant drugs
Pondimin and Redux from the market by the manufacturer, American Home Products
(AHP). Protest from physicians attempting to deal with morbid obesity was loud but
unavailing. Even if government concerns about the drugs were quieted (the side effects
though serious were relatively rare and nothing in comparison to the risks of morbid
obesity) the company had no wish to continue the battle.
110. Aaron Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectation: Enhancing the Role of
Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861, 868 (1983).
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MINOR FACTORS
1. Tenuous causation: The case for causation-in-fact may be tenu-
ous i.e. it may not be certain that the targeted defective design feature
actually caused the plaintiffs harm. This will especially be the case
when the evidence supporting the causal connection is statistical."'
2. Shifting duty: Independent and responsible decision-makers,
other than the designers, may have played a significant role in assess-
ing and utilizing the allegedly hazardous product. This would be rele-
vant for instance if there were all sorts of other options available on the
market.
3. Consumer choice: Consumers may wish to preserve the option
to purchase a less expensive or otherwise desirable product without
the alleged safety feature.
4. Obviousness of danger: The hazard may be open and obvious to
the ordinary consumer.
5. Cost: An alternative design could substantially raise the cost of
the product to the consumer.
6. Design safety review process: The safety review process that led
to the formulation of the product's design may have been extensive.
7. Legislation and other governmental input: Governmental safety
regulations may have played an important role in the design process.
These factors might be put together in various combinations.
Consider the following. The first three seem obviously very important
and might be considered the major factors. It could be arranged then
that when all of these (or two out of three) are present the design ques-
tion is not justiciable and judgment as a matter of law should be
entered for the defendant. Alternatively if only one (or two) are found,
then the showing of a certain number of minor factors would deter-
mine the matter. Thus, if only factor number 1 is present, but four of
the seven minor factors can be shown, then the proposed design
change should not be put to the jury.
It would probably be more objective and more workable to give
number values to the factors (scored system) as follows. Double num-
ber value can be assigned to the major factors, but this does not always
make much difference in the result since the maximum possible score
is also thereby increased. A simple 0-2-1 system has therefore been
adopted here and arranged so that a high score is bad for plaintiff.
1. Polycentric design question?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
111. Noting the dictum of Lord Rutherford (Nobel prizewinner of electromagnetic
fame) that statistics was a terrible way to do science (reported in various versions).
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2. Are overall risk/benefit advantages of alternative design supe-
rior to challenged design?
[YES = 0, NO = +2, MAYBE = +1]
3. State of the art technology available?
[YES = 0, NO = +2, MAYBE = +1]
4. Was harm due to alleged defective design?
[YES = 0, NO = +2, MAYBE = +1]
5. Shifting duty: independent responsible decision-makers
involved in design choices?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +11
6. Preservation of consumer choice issues present?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +11
7. Danger obvious?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
8. Cost of alternative design too high?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +11
9. Extensive safety review in design process?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
10. Governmental safety regulations incorporated in the design?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
Both systems may be illustrated by applying them to the facts of
Dawson v. Chrysler where the plaintiff, a police officer, was injured
when his patrol car crashed into a metal pole in a culvert. 1 2 The pole
pressed into the side of the car and the plaintiff was propelled up bang-
ing into the roof thus injuring his neck and rendering him
quadriplegic. The proposed design change was additional metal in the
frame to stiffen it and prevent collapse inward. Chrysler argued that
stiffening the frame would reduce its ability to absorb force in a differ-
ent kind of accident increasing the likelihood of injury.
Applying the weighted factor system, it can be seen that the prob-
lem is polycentric, so that further design might be necessary to deal
with the loss of force-absorbing capacity in the new design and it is not
clear how this is to be accomplished. There is clearly a close call as to
the risk/benefit characteristics of the compared designs. There was no
state of the art problem. Thus, only one or doubtfully two major fac-
tors are present. None of the minor factors are clearly present so that
without further facts, deciding the issue would depend on whether the
system allowed decision on the basis of the presence of two major
factors.
112. 630 F.2d 950 (NJ. 1980).
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The scored system could be read as follows. Polycentricity +2;
close risk/benefit characteristics +1; technology available 0; causation
doubtful +1; no independent decision makers involved +1; consumer
choice doubtful +1; danger not obvious +1; costs of alternative design
possibly high if gas costs are included +1; probably extensive safety
review in design process +2; governmental safety regulations probably
incorporated in design process +2. The total then would be 12 out of a
possible score of 20, i.e., the result is just above the median line.
Since the summed score is above the median, this suggests that
the result, though close, favors the defendant. The fact that an entire
line of products is in jeopardy might make it desirable that the score
should be significantly below the median line before the case should
be deemed sufficiently in favor of the plaintiff to be submitted to the
jury. This might especially be the case when, as here, the design pro-
posals are clearly polycentric and therefore unsuitable for jury deter-
mination. This was in fact the intuitive feeling of the judge deciding
the case." 3
§20 Problem (5) - The impossibility of providing litigation-proof
warnings and instructions
The long list of requirements for an adequate set of warnings and
instructions has been treated earlier in § 14. They are clear and reason-
able when considered in the abstract, but difficult to apply in actual
cases. There are a number of reasons for this:
1. It is almost impossible to anticipate all the odd circumstances
that can produce an accident.
2. Users vary greatly in their ability to read and follow instruc-
tions, depending on their level of intelligence, education and even cul-
tural factors.
3. If some degree of user inadvertence or even carelessness is to
be anticipated, how much should this be considered and incorporated
into the warnings, e.g. with especially lurid symbols or color codes to
catch the users attention.
4. Space for containing warnings and instructions is not infinite
but limited. Ideally the warnings should leap out to the user from the
label on the product, but the list of dangers tends to be long and the
appropriate accompanying safety instructions are therefore bulky and
113. See Dawson, 630 F.2d at 950. See also Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens,
An Unhappy Return to Confusion in the Common Law of Products Liability - Denny v.
Ford Motor Company Should Be Overturned, 17 PACE L. REv. 359 (1997). See also James
A. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
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complicated. The label then is unable to contain all this information
and it spills over into an accompanying brochure or booklet that is too
long for most people to read and in any case may quickly be lost.
5. There is also the dilution effect, mentioned earlier-namely
that multiplying warnings diminishes the effect.
6. Finally and most importantly, the elements of warnings and
safety instructions are so numerous that it is almost impossible to
imagine putting them all together into a label or instruction book with
any hope that they would prove adequate in a given set of
circumstances.
Since the task appears hopeless it is hardly surprising that the
production of instruction booklets is not always taken seriously. Some
manufacturers give-up and supply no warnings whatsoever, dumping
responsibility for identifying and avoiding risks on to the user. This is
particularly the case with familiar and much used substances, where it
is hoped that common knowledge will be sufficient notice of danger.
Indeed putting warnings on such items might be considered an admis-
sion that they were dangerous or an admission that the danger was not
obvious and therefore required a warning, which would almost inevita-
bly be deemed inadequate.
One response to this clearly undesirable state of affairs is for fed-
eral government departments to provide official sets of warnings and
instructions that shall be deemed sufficient. This route has been taken
with a number of products, for example, tobacco. An official govern-
ment mandated package insert gets rid of the warning problems so far
as manufacturers are concerned. If the official warnings and instruc-
tions are given, there is no liability. Unfortunately the official warning
system does not work so well for users. Government agencies can get
very far behind in their tasks, especially now with downsizing of staff.
The current set of official notices may then fail to notify the users of
serious risks and even dangers." 4 The other problem is that govern-
mental agencies are more likely to set up reporting systems where
every adverse reaction is noted. The result is a mass of undigested
information that may have no real causal connection with the item in
question. Finally, the governmental warnings are likely to be bulky,
rendering them unusable. So far as medicinal drugs are concerned,
the task of pharmacovigilance may be more properly assigned to a
committee of experts, e.g. professors from pharmacology departments
114. Note that in safety engineering parlance, potential harm is not the same thing
as danger. Danger is defined as unreasonable risk of harm.
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in prestigious medical schools. 115 Such a committee would be respon-
sible for sifting through the mass of reports of adverse reactions to
medications and issuing responsible advisories and warnings that
would be very helpful to the general public.
While all these measures are appropriate and potentially useful,
ultimately the manufacturers must accept responsibility for the safety
of their products with oversight from government agencies and ulti-
mate review of individual cases by the courts. If this can be accom-
plished without subjecting manufacturers to the constant threat of
litigation, the system would probably be acceptable to all parties. The
key again would be to screen out all but the most legitimate cases
before trial or at least prior to submission to a jury. A formal evalua-
tion system might be helpful here. Important factors to be considered
would be:
1. The reliability of the causal connection between the item and
the harm.
2. Actual or imputed knowledge of the danger on the part of the
manufacturer.
3. Whether the danger could have been discovered by more ade-
quate testing.
4. Whether the danger could have been avoided by state of the art
design or other safety measures.
5. The extent to which the danger was common knowledge.
6. Whether there was actual knowledge of the danger on the part
of the plaintiff.
7. The amount and level of safety testing actually carried out by
the manufacturer.
A number weighted factor system could be devised for these items,
but considering that each of them is often crucial and determinative in
itself a decisional algorithm might be more appropriate.
Failure to read instructions and warnings has not been included
in the diagram as it is a form of user fault that is not really relevant to
the question of the adequacy of warnings and instructions. However,
it might be deemed present in the diagram since failure to read warn-
ings will raise the issue of proximate cause." 6
115. The Dunlop Committee in Britain was established along these lines. It has now
been replaced by a Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM) which has set up a
Yellow Card Scheme, a reporting system where all known or even suspected adverse
reactions following treatment with a drug are reported. Some 25,000 such reports are
registered each year in the U.K.
116. See §22 infra.
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§21 Problem (6) - Difficulties in measuring user fault
In general, plaintiff fault is an important notion in torts, but it has
some peculiarities in products liability cases that merit special atten-
tion. Estimates vary, but it has been calculated that over two-thirds of
all injuries related to consumer goods are predominantly, if not
entirely, due to misuse and abuse of the product. User fault thus fea-
tures prominently as a defense in products liability cases.1 17
One of the early problems with "strict liability" under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts was that a number of courts took the position
that since due care is not a defense, then fault on the part of the user
should be irrelevant also. This problem carried over into relatively
modern times in the debate as to whether comparative fault could be
used in strict liability cases. It was argued that the two forms of liabil-
ity, defect and fault, were like apples and oranges that could not be
compared to one another. For the most part this controversy can be
considered settled. The notion that plaintiff fault was irrelevant is now
repudiated in MUPLA, Restatement (Third) of Torts-Products Liabil-
ity (R3T-PL) and in most state products liability statutes. It has also
been abandoned by the courts in most jurisdictions. In some form or
other, by some kind of reasoning or other, the fault of the plaintiff is
taken into consideration, calculated as a percentage figure and used to
reduce or bar recovery. This is hardly surprising. It is very difficult to
keep user fault out of the picture. It has been said that if you kick it
out through the door it returns through the window. If excluded in the
form of plaintiffs negligence it re-enters as misuse or abuse or even
under the notion of causation. It is thus handled in a number of ways
and under various headings.
Even though there is now general agreement that user fault is a
relevant consideration in products cases, significant disagreements
exist on matters of detail. The two main areas of contention are: 1)
how should user fault be allowed for and calculated in a recovery, and
2) is it necessary for user fault to be classified into various sub-
types?' 18 There are four main ways in which courts have dealt with
and considered user fault:
1. Contributory negligence.
117. Accident statistics tend to be collected under special heading such as
automobile accidents, domestic accidents, industrial accidents and so on. Any overall
estimate is thus likely to be an educated guess, but the relation of accidents to user
fault of one sort or another is certainly high. Accident statistics collected by the
University of Maryland can be viewed at www.umm.edu/non-trauma/stats.htm.
118. See §22 infra.
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An objective standard is used: what a reasonable person with the
knowledge and experience of the plaintiff would do to protect them-
selves under the circumstances. It must, however, be remembered that
the reasonable person is allowed to be a little less careful for their own
safety than when dealing with that of others. This more lenient stan-
dard of care is particularly noticeable in cases arising out of accidents
in the work place where workers are under pressures of one kind or
another to perform and produce. In the tiny minority of states that
retain the contributory negligence doctrine (including North Carolina)
user negligence is a complete defense, totally barring recovery.
2. Pure comparative fault.
Comparative negligence has several forms. In the pure form as
outlined in Li v. Yellow Cabs, the trier of fact may allocate any percent-
age of fault (ranging from 0% to 100%) to the user and it will be
deducted from the recovery." 19
3. Modified comparative fault.
In most comparative fault jurisdictions, percentage reduction only
operates up to a certain threshold level (50% or some other measure)
above which it is a complete bar to recovery.
4. Assumption of the risk.
Assumption of the risk, a concept particularly associated with lia-
bility for unreasonably dangerous activities, is a defense to strict liabil-
ity under §402A.12 ° It is essentially a particular form of plaintiff
negligence, which acts as a superseding cause relieving the defendant
of liability, much as an intentionally wrong act would do and for much
the same reasons. Its elements are:
a. Subjective knowledge of the danger,
b. Voluntary acceptance of the risk, and
c. The finding that taking the risk was unreasonable.' 2 '
Some jurisdictions still observe a distinction between primary
and secondary assumption of the risk. Primary assumption of the risk
is sometimes called a "no duty" type of case because the plaintiff either
expressly or impliedly agrees to hold the defendant harmless. This
could be seen, for instance, where a neighbor lends a car to a husband
rushing his wife to hospital in an obstetrical emergency where the life
of the fetus was threatened by prolapse of the umbilical cord. The
neighbor is willing to help but informs the husband that that the
119. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
120. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A cmt. n.
121. If there was no reasonable alternative, using a product known to be defective
would hardly be considered assumption of the risk. Thus in the example given above,
driving a car with known defective brakes might be considered a reasonable choice.
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brakes are defective and that the car is dangerous. The husband, how-
ever, might well reply that this was the least of his worries in the pre-
sent circumstances and proceed to borrow the car. If the defective
brakes cause an accident where husband, wife and baby are injured,
the neighbor would not be liable to them, nor probably to anyone else.
This distinction, once considered rather obsolete, since it made no dif-
ference in the result (no liability with any kind of assumption of the
risk), has assumed new importance in comparative negligence juris-
dictions where the "modern" approach (represented in MUPLA and
R3T-PL) is to make primary assumption of the risk an absolute
defense, but to treat the secondary type, where both plaintiff and
defendant are at fault, as a form of comparative fault which will reduce
but not necessarily bar plaintiffs recovery.
The various ways in which user fault is handled are based on pref-
erences concerning the basic values involved. Those who emphasize
exact fairness in dealing with the injured plaintiff will tend to favor
pure comparative fault where the recovery is only reduced by the
amount proportional to the user's contribution to their own harm.
Those (few) who still hold to contributory negligence feel that society
as a whole should not be taxed to support foolish behavior by individ-
uals. The threshold forms of comparative fault represent a compro-
mise between these extremes where the recovery will be
proportionately reduced up to a certain percentage of fault, allowing
for fairness to the plaintiff, but beyond that point recovery will be
barred, taking into consideration the interests of society as a whole.
These alternatives do not exhaust the available options nor are
any of them beyond criticism. The main problem with each of them is
the way in which they are likely to be applied by the jury (or the court
where a jury is not available). Jurors must be informed of the effects of
their determination of fault, and this is likely to affect and even distort
their judgment. Juries may thus deny and discount plaintiff fault alto-
gether in a contributory negligence jurisdiction since they know that
finding fault will totally bar recovery. Similarly juries in a modified
comparative negligence jurisdiction are likely to reduce plaintiff fault
to a point just below the barring threshold to allow the plaintiff to
recover. In the pure comparative fault jurisdictions, attorneys often
complain that the juries, or the court, rather quickly give a 50/50 allot-
ment of user fault rather than wasting time getting an agreement on a
more precise set of numbers.
The problem with each of these systems is that they are either too
simple (contributory fault) or too complicated (both forms of compara-
tive fault). Something in between might achieve fairness and be easier
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for juries to understand and apply. Describing the point at which any-
thing lies on a continuum is always a difficult task; it is generally better
to provide a simpler scale with three or four items on it. Applied to the
present purpose, jurors might be asked to decide whether the plain-
tiffs fault, if present and not a total bar, could properly be described as
10%, 25%, 50% or 75%. 122 Given such a simple scale the jury could
probably come to an agreement fairly rapidly, certainly more easily
than in pure comparative fault. This would also allow for reasonable
fairness and prevent the jury from artificially manipulating their num-
bers to prevent what they see as an injustice. Where the jury cannot
agree on a particular percentage of user fault, the matter can be
resolved by the court in a number of ways. There is no need to detail
these here. 1 23 They can be regarded as formulae that the court can
apply to a jury response that is not unanimous. Simplicity is not so
important here as the court is a single individual and moreover, over
time, would become familiar with the formula and comfortable with its
use.
§22 Problem (7) - Should forms of user fault be lumped together or
classified into subtypes
User fault can be subdivided into a number of subtypes according
to the type of improper handling exhibited by the defendant. These
are misuse (handling the article other than as instructed), alteration
(e.g., removing the safety devices) and abuse of the product (e.g., not
maintaining it properly). There are two main ways in which this mat-
ter can be viewed:
1. The traditional approach has been to treat these as all-or-noth-
ing defenses, either relieving the defendant of all liability or, if deemed
foreseeable misuses, leaving the recovery undiminished introducing a
new carburetor into a boat to engage in water sports might well be
considered an unforeseeable misuse that would bar recovery. On the
other hand "hot wiring" a defective starter which, despite numerous
returns to the dealer for repair, had failed to work and was rendering a
tractor useless, might be deemed foreseeable and reasonable, allowing
full recovery.
2. The modern (perhaps ultramodern) approach, represented by
MUPLA and R3T-PL, is to put all forms of user fault (including secon-
122. Daly v. General Motors, 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978) where a similar scheme was
advocated by Mr. Justice Clark, a vigorous critic of pure comparative fault.
123. An average of the various percentages might be calculated and the result
adjusted to the nearest of the allowed percentage figures. A variant of this is where the
lowest and highest numbers are discounted and the remainder averaged.
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dary assumption of the risk, misuse, alteration and abuse) in the same
category (mixed together in the same pot) and allow the trier of fact to
consider them together and reduce recovery by an appropriate amount
ranging from 100% to 0%. This has been followed in a number of
cases, has wide approval among scholars, and will probably prevail in
comparative fault jurisdictions. Its main virtue is that it is simpler for
juries to understand since it avoids instructions on the different kinds
of user fault.
These two alternatives, the traditional and the new, are not totally
exclusive of one another in that the trier of fact in the modern
approach is free to award 100% of the recovery or nothing at all as they
see fit. Unfortunately this is a jury decision where sympathy for a
badly injured plaintiff might enter into the process. From the perspec-
tive of the defendant, it would be preferable to have the court decide as
a matter of law whether a misuse, alteration or abuse, was so entirely
out of line (like modifying a fishing boat for racing) that it did not
raise a jury question. However, if the misuse was reasonable, then the
jury might be allowed to decide whether and by how much the award
should be reduced. This would seem to be the kind of question where
a scored factor analysis might prove helpful. Any number of factors
might be identified in a particular case but the following list may be
taken as a provisional model in a misuse/alteration case, where high
numbers are bad for the plaintiff.
1. Was the alteration in response to some defect in the article?
[YES =0, NO=+2 MAYBE= +1]
2. Was there a reasonable alternative to the present design?
[YES = 0, NO = +2, Maybe = +1]
3. Could the misuse/alteration be expected to interfere with the
functioning of the article?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
4. Could the alteration or misuse be deemed a dangerous
action?
[NO = 0, YES= +2, MAYBE = +1]
5. If the change was made by a third party was the plaintiff
aware of it?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1] OR
If the change was made by the plaintiff, was ze competent to make
the alteration safely? [YES = 0, NO = +2, MAYBE = +1]
6. Was there misuse/alteration for a useful purpose not just a
frolic?
[YES = 0, NO = +2, MAYBE = +1]
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7. Was there any other plaintiff fault that contributed to the
harm?
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +11
A larger or smaller number of factors might be listed as being rele-
vant in a particular case. In the set listed here the median score would
be 7. A score below this would suggest that the matter might be con-
sidered a jury question (presented with a four point scale as described
in the previous section) or if very low might suggest a directed verdict
for the plaintiff. A score greater than 7 (or 8 or 9) would indicate that a
directed verdict for the defendant would be appropriate. The system,
like any other formal game, will not always yield bright line directives
as to how the case should be decided. It must be remembered that
number games are not real life, and a numbered factor system such as
this is only intended to be an aid to decision, not a mechanical tool to
be rigidly and unthinkingly applied.
The working of this system may be illustrated by applying it to the
facts of an actual case. 12 4 A tractor was supplied to the plaintiff that
proved difficult to start. It was taken several times to the dealer and
returned as fixed, but the problem was still present. The plaintiff's
brother, who worked for him, needed to use the tractor and "hot wired"
the starter. This bypassed the safety devices was designed to only
allow the engine to start if the vehicle was neutral or park. The plain-
tiff, unaware of his brother's actions, pressed the starter while standing
beside the tractor. The tractor was in gear (not neutral or park) and
ran over him, causing serious injuries. If this fact situation is run
through the scored factor system above, one derives scores of 0 + 0 + 2
+ 2 +0 + 0 + 2 with a total of 6 out of a possible score of 14. This result,
coming below the median score, would suggest that this might be a
jury question. In the actual case the court decided that the alteration
was sufficient to act as a total bar to recovery, however, the decision
was controversial and had the factor system been used, a score below
the median might have suggested to the court that they ponder deeply
before deciding on a directed verdict.
Once it is decided that a jury question exists, the modern
approach may be best, throwing all of these factors into the pot so that
the jury can make appropriate deductions for user fault. The advan-
tage here is that separate instructions for each kind of user fault are
not required and therefore the jury is less likely to be confused by
complicated legal terms. Again the four-category system (deducting
124. Ford Motor Co. v. Eads, 457 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1970).
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10%, 25%, 50% or 75%) would seem simpler and easier for juries to
manage than current arrangements.
Alternatively, each item of fault could be measured by the jury on
the four-point percentage scale, allowing the court to add the scores
together and perhaps take an average of them as the final percentage of
plaintiff fault. This might be an interesting research project but is
clearly too complicated to commend itself for adoption in actual
practice.
Failure to read instructions and warnings is another form of user
fault that merits a special note. The general rule is that warnings and
instructions are deemed read. One who proceeds to use the product
without reading them cannot complain if zes failure to do so proves
harmful.1 25 Even if the warnings were inadequate, failure to read them
will raise the issue of proximate cause. A defective warning can hardly
be thought to have been the cause of an accident when it would not
have been read even if it were adequate. However, a few courts in par-
ticular circumstances have ruled that failure to read the instructions
does not necessarily bar the plaintiffs recovery. The reasoning here is
that if adequate warnings had been provided, some users would read
them and the information provided might pass into common knowl-
edge and perhaps reach the ears of the plaintiff.1 26  This latter
approach may seem to favor careless plaintiffs too much, and given the
present fiscally conservative climate of thought in products liability
the more strict approach, requiring warnings and instructions to be
read, is probably to be preferred.
§23 Problem (7) Allocating liability among multiple defendants
The old common law held that the plaintiff must prove zes case
against each defendant individually. 127 This was obviously inconve-
nient for all parties and was replaced by more practical arrangements
such as equitable joinder, where all issues in an event with more than
one party involved were decided together at the same hearing. Yet it
was still necessary for the plaintiff to prove the case against each defen-
dant individually in order to hold him or her jointly and severally 1ia-
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §99B, which is fairly typical of state products liability
statutes.
126. See Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 74 N.C. App. 736, 330 S.E.2d 228
(1985), where a warning, though not needed for the physician anesthesiologist who
was already aware of the problem, might have somehow reached the nurse anesthetist
handling the case.
127. William Prosser, PROSSER ON TORTS (7th ed. 1976) (citing Sadler v. Great W.
Ry. [1896] A.C. 450).
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ble. This older rule has been relaxed in several circumstances. The
simplest of these is when there are several defendants, all at fault and
potentially liable, but it is not certain which of them caused the prob-
lem. The rule laid down in the famous case of Summers v. Tice, is clear
and generally followed: all defendants are liable unless they can show
that their fault did not cause the plaintiffs harm. 12 8 The situation is
not so clear when some of these possible defendants were at fault but
others were not; the traditional rule is that Summers v. Tice does not
apply and the older common law rule prevails: if it cannot be shown
which of the defendants caused the harm, the plaintiff cannot recover
against any of them. Most of the cases representing this rule are old 2 9
and one wonders if it would or should survive. It would seem better,
following Wigmore, to make all the defendants who are at fault liable
unless they can prove that their fault did not cause the plaintiffs
harm. 130
Another type of multiple defendant case is where several persons
act together in a joint enterprise. These are taken to be, in effect, a civil
conspiracy, with individuals joined together for a wrongful purpose;
and each of the individuals will be held responsible even though ze did
not individually cause any harm to the plaintiffs. 13 1 Other recent
developments in the law relating to multiple defendants are more con-
troversial. Joint activity has been extended to cover all the parties asso-
ciated with a hospital operation even though they are acting
independently on the ground that they had a special duty to care for
the unconscious patient during surgery.' 32 Even more controversial
are the cases arising from use of the drug DES to prevent threatened
abortions during pregnancy. The drug was effective but the incidence
of pelvic cancer was high among the surviving infants. The cancers
did not appear until late teens or early twenties, by which time it was
no longer certain which manufacturer had supplied the pills taken by
the parent. The famous case of Sindell v. Abbott applied a market share
approach, holding manufacturers liable for the harm in proportion to
their share of the market. 133 This was a very bold departure from basic
128. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
129. They are commonly railway cases where sparks from the engine created a fire
which merged with another conflagration caused, e.g., by lightning. Courts in the 19th
century appear to have favored railways as a matter of policy.
130. Wigmore, EVIDENCE 299 (3d ed. 1940).
131. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968).
132. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1948).
133. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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common law principles, where liability is based on fault134 and Sindel
has not been followed very widely. It has been considered especially
obnoxious in that it is likely that defendants without fault could still
be liable, since it would be difficult to establish their innocence after
such a great lapse of time. There are several other problems with the
market share theory, especially that it has many possible variants. The
market share can be calculated nationally or in the relevant state (or
locality). In one case the parties were not even allowed to avoid liabil-
ity by showing either no fault or that their product did not cause the
harm.135 Joint enterprise cases are therefore likely to be, and probably
should be restricted in their application.
One serious problem with multiple defendants relates to how
their share of the liability is computed. The usual method is a pro rata
split where the judgment or settlement is divided equally among all the
defendants present to answer in court, who can in turn seek contribu-
tion from other liable parties. If some of the defendants are not solvent
then their share is usually divided among the others so that the recov-
ery of the plaintiff is not reduced. This arrangement between defend-
ants may be followed even in comparative negligence states. 136 The
plaintiff's fault is taken into consideration and computed as a percent-
age of the total damage, but the rest is divided equally among the
defendants. The reason given for this departure from the comparative
fault principle, is that more than one percentage calculation would be
too confusing for the jury. However, an increasing number of jurisdic-
tions, probably the majority now, apportion fault between all parties,
both plaintiff and defendants, in a comparative manner, though there
are several variant arrangements. 137 In such cases it is likely that each
of the defendants will pay only their own share they will not be jointly
and severally liable. This system is intended to be fairer to defendants,
but it may do so at the expense of the plaintiff. It is a departure from
the common law view, which held that the innocent plaintiff should be
134. In the case of strict liability there is still an element of fault present, either
bringing a dangerous entity on to the land or releasing a defective article into the
stream of commerce.
135. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
136. Retained in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1955 edition.
But see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 11, at 69, where it is stated that a majority of
states now have replaced pro rata shares among tortfeasors with an equitable
contribution arrangement (there are several types) which relates the amount of the
share of each tortfeasor to their fault.
137. If a defendant's fault exceeds that of (the plaintiff or a certain figure) that
defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the
damages.
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compensated in full, even if it involved some unfairness to the defend-
ants, who were after all at fault. This debate is largely political with
defendants and their insurers obtaining reform legislation applying
equitable division of damages to them, and plaintiff oriented interests
opposing them both in the legislature and by constitutional challenge
in court. There are a number of variants on equitable apportionment
of damages, but none have commended themselves to all or even the
majority of jurisdictions. 13  It is perhaps worth noting that the
Restatement (Third) of Torts - Products liability, takes no position on
this issue and has simply left the state courts to follow their own rules.
PART V. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
§24 Overview of the argument
The review section of this article (Parts I - III) outlines the mod-
ern history of products liability law. Part 1I describes the earlier stages
of this development where older remedies such as negligence, express
and implied warranties, strict liability for dangerous entities, negligent
speech etc., originally developed in earlier and simpler circumstances,
were modified in various ways to function in the modern world of
mass manufacture and distribution. The ghosts of these older reme-
dies created problems, e.g. continuing confusions relating to such
things as privity and prompt notice of defect under Uniform Commer-
cial Code provisions. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A
attempted to substitute a completely new apparatus in the form of
strict liability for defective products. This too proved troublesome,
especially when it was applied to design and warning defects. But the
main problem with §402A was its vague universal definition of defect,
employing the user expectation test. This was difficult to explain to
juries and almost bound to produce inconsistent results, except in very
clear cases, since the average user does not know what they should
expect. Therefore, in the seventies and eighties therefore, the idea of a
single general notion of all defects was abandoned and separate, indi-
vidual and objective definitions of the different types of product defect
were substituted. This process was finally expressed in the Model Uni-
form Products Liability ACT (MUPLA) and in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts - Products Liability. Manufacturing defects were defined and
proved by showing variance from the original design or blueprint;
design defects were proved by showing an alternative safer feasible
138. The variations are indeed legion. It is common to make defendants jointly and
severally liable when their percentage measure of fault reaches a certain figure, say
50%. Others allow joint and several liability only when the plaintiff is without fault.
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design; packaging (warnings) defects were proved by the presence of a
non-obvious danger where harm could be prevented or mitigated by
the presence of appropriate warnings and instructions. This modern
approach has been steadily taking over the field of products liability so
that only shreds of the older strict liability under §402A remain, and
these remnants are largely confined to manufacturing defects. The
current trend is to dissociate these new remedies entirely from their
original sources and define them completely afresh. The recommenda-
tion is to continue this process to its logical conclusion and abandon
the old remedies with regard to products altogether, as they seem more
confusing than helpful.
A number of problems remain, some of them with obvious solu-
tions, others more difficult, and some seemingly intractable with no
clear remedy. These have been described in Part IV. Some suggestions
for dealing with these problems have been made, but these must be
considered possible escape routes from Egypt to be explored, rather
than sure paths to the promised land.
The first is a major problem, the continuing use of older remedies,
especially the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. These can
be made to function fairly well in modern conditions and have in fact
proved most useful, but they carry with them the baggage of their con-
ceptual origins which can be confusing, especially to juries. The rec-
ommendation of the late Dr. Gary Schwartz, representing the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, seems well placed, suggesting that the
UCC should be confined to its original commercial purposes, allowing
products liability law to develop along its own lines. The objective for-
mulations of MUPLA and the Restatement (Third) of Torts would seem
to be an adequate foundation for this. The action in negligence would,
of course, continue in those cases where actual fault could be shown
on the part of manufacturers and distributors.
The second problem is fixing liability for defects (other than
design and warning defects) which might have originated anywhere in
the chain of distribution. The recommendation of Restatement (Third)
of Torts seems reasonable here, namely that liability should be fixed
with the ultimate vendor, who may then "vouch in" those higher up the
chain or seek contribution/indemnity from them. This would seem
contrary to the current trend, supported by MUPLA and many state
statutes, to relieve the ultimate vendors of liability, but this is not nec-
essarily so. There are already several exceptions to the sellers' non-
liability, e.g. where the manufacturer/distributor is bankrupt or other-
wise unavailable. These are included to ensure that injured users will
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not go uncompensated. And R3T-PL is simply adding one more excep-
tion to the general rule. 139
The third problem, concerning the difficulty of proving a design
defect does not have any easy solution. Making plaintiff recovery eas-
ier would mean condemning entire product lines and creating serious
adverse economic consequences for society as a whole. The injured
users, especially those who do not seem apt to obtain a very large
recovery, will probably have no recourse but to apply for inclusion in a
mass compensation scheme devised for dangerous items with proven
design defects. These are at present slow and unsatisfactory arrange-
ments but vigorous efforts are being made to improve them.
The fourth problem, design by jury, is grounded in the fact that
design defect cases commonly require sophisticated expert testimony
and demonstrations which are difficult for lay persons to understand.
The result may be to condemn a design as unsafe on insufficient or
entirely mistaken grounds or even to give a sympathy vote against the
design, to compensate a catastrophically injured plaintiff. A widely
favored solution is to keep such complex design questions from the
jury if possible, and give judgment according to law wherever reasona-
ble and fair. Professor Twerski has provided a list of factors that might
be used by lawyers and courts for this purpose. 140 Unfortunately, as
with all such lists, there are no instructions as to how it might be used.
Weighted and scored versions of these factors have been proposed and
illustrated as formal aids to indicate those cases where grants of sum-
mary judgment and directed verdict would be appropriate.
The fifth problem is the virtual impossibility of devising an ade-
quate set of warnings and instructions that will provide for all circum-
stances and uses of a product. Someone, somewhere, somehow, is
going to use the article in some odd and dangerous way. And some of
these people will go on to claim that the misuse was foreseeable and
that a better package insert would have prevented or mitigated the
resulting injuries. The present trend on the part of manufacturers and
distributors is to obtain governmental immunity provided they use a
standard set of warnings. This approach is satisfactory to producers
but not to users, as it is unlikely that the standard warnings can be
kept up to date. The suggested approach was to allow the courts to
ensure that a good faith effort has been made to provide suitable pack-
aging information. As with design defect cases, only those that are
139. There are two exceptions if one considers the recommendation to toll the
statute of limitations when a defendant becomes bankrupt after they have been named
by the ultimate seller who was then relieved of liability.
140. See §19 infra.
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clearly meritorious should survive summary judgment and reach the
jury. A decisional algorithm is provided to assist attorneys and courts
in weeding out the weak cases.
The sixth problem is the management of user fault. The notion
that user fault does not matter is obsolete, but the current formulae for
measuring fault are all unsatisfactory. Pure comparative fault is too
vague and is often adjusted to 50% as a simple time saving compro-
mise; contributory fault is too harsh on plaintiffs; and both contribu-
tory and modified comparative fault have the flaw that the jury must
be told the legal effect of their determination. Thus the jury members
are likely to manipulate the finding of fault to the point where the
plaintiff can recover something. The suggestion here is that a limited
item scale should be used to allow the jury to find the plaintiff 10%,
25%, 50% or 75% at fault. This would be easy to understand and
would probably allow jurors to adjust the recovery for plaintiff fault
more quickly, without needing to compromise their findings to deal
more kindly with the plaintiff.
The seventh problem is whether the special categories of defense
such as misuse, alteration, assumption of the risk, etc., should con-
tinue as separate entities, with separate jury instructions or be treated
as fungible items and merged together to provide a single percentage
figure that would be used to reduce the plaintiff's recovery. Both
MUPLA and R3T-PL favor the second method, mixing all forms of user
fault together in the same pot. This approach has several advantages
especially in that it simplifies matters for juries. However, the stan-
dard for summary judgment is too vague in cases of unforeseeable mis-
use and primary assumption of the risk where the defendant is not at
fault, and where the plaintiff would not formerly have been allowed to
recover anything. It would seem that these too, according to the new
thinking, would be left to the jury with the expectation that they would
allow a complete recovery with no reduction (0% reduction) or no
recovery at all (100%) reduction in such cases. But there is no guaran-
tee that juries will act in this manner. Such cases should therefore be
handled by summary judgment or directed verdict and not submitted
to the jury at all. Weighted and scored sets of factors have been pro-
vided as an illustration of how this objection should be met and cases
assigned to or removed from the purview of the jury.
A brief review of the law relating to multiple defendants was
attempted. This presents some difficult problems for which no one
seems to have a clear solution at this time. The advice of Savigny
would seem sound here, to refrain from formalizing the law on any
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subject until it, and the social conditions on which it rests, have
achieved a stable developed form. 41
§25 Looking ahead
1. Products liability has gone through three phases in the last cen-
tury: the permissive phase which favored industry and commerce; the
rapid development phase in the sixties and seventies with the introduc-
tion of strict liability and other measures designed to facilitate com-
pensation of injured users and to make industry "pay its way" and
finally the reflective phase of the eighties and nineties. This last phase
has been viewed by some as a temporary swing of the pendulum in the
direction of industry, motivated by economic nervousness. Other
commentators view it as a permanent or long-term position represent-
ing mature reflection on the compensation system. There are cur-
rently misgivings about the appropriateness of courts and juries to
settle all questions of compensation. These misgivings have been par-
ticularly strong in relation to two kinds of case, design defect cases
(with the danger of design by jury) and multiple-plaintiff cases (mass
torts) where inconsistent verdicts can and do occur and where there is
the danger that late-arriving plaintiffs may find that the defendant is
bankrupt. In any event the next decade is likely to be more difficult for
plaintiffs in all jurisdictions. This is already true in design cases where
proof of defect is now so complex and expensive to be almost
impossible.
2. It would seem likely that alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
and other extra-legal procedures will become increasingly important in
the products field, especially in design cases. An expert arbitrator may
be called in either by the courts or by agreement of the parties. In
mass tort cases a fund may be set up to provide fixed limited compen-
sation for large numbers of plaintiffs.
3. It is widely recognized that there is probably no such thing as
an adequate warning when there is a severely injured plaintiff. It is
therefore likely that there will be an increase in the use of fixed official
warnings that will relieve manufacturers of all liability. How these will
be produced is another matter, since government agencies are under-
staffed and notoriously slow to react to new information. Important
new warnings may not be made available for years.
4. It is submitted that formal representation of the law in algo-
rithms and other formal systems will facilitate accurate communica-
141. Frederick Charles von Savigny, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION
AND JURISPRUDENCE (1831) (translated by Abraham Hayward 2000).
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tion between researchers, practitioners and other concerned parties. A
few first steps in this direction have been described here. It is also
submitted that decisional logics, in the form of scored and weighted
factor lists, would be helpful when important decisions (such as
whether or not to submit an issue to the jury) must be made. The
formal systems used here have largely been imported from the world of
medicine and business. Many other useful formal systems are proba-
bly waiting out there to be noticed and put to use in the study and
practice of law.
69
McQuade: Products Liability - Emerging Consensus and Persisting Problems:
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002
